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ABSTRACT 
  A surprising amount of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, 
nonsense. But courts and scholars have done little to consider whether 
or why such meaningless speech falls within “the freedom of speech.” 
If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from sound and 
expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for nonsense is 
complicated. And because nonsense is widespread, the case is also 
important—artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the 
only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the 
outcome. 
  This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship 
between nonsense and the freedom of speech; in doing so, it suggests 
ways to determine what “meaning” means for First Amendment 
purposes. The Article begins by demonstrating the scope and 
constitutional salience of meaningless speech, showing that nonsense 
is multifarious, widespread, and sometimes intertwined with 
traditional First Amendment values like the marketplace of ideas, 
autonomy, and democracy. The second part of the Article argues that 
exploring nonsense can illuminate the meaning of meaning itself. 
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This, too, is an important task, for although free speech discourse 
often relies on the concept of meaning to chart the Amendment’s 
scope, courts and scholars have done relatively little to establish what 
it entails. Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have spent much of the 
past century doing little else. Their efforts—echoes of which can 
already be heard in First Amendment doctrine—suggest that free 
speech doctrine is best served by finding meaning in the way words 
are used, rather than in the degree to which they represent 
extralinguistic concepts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose approach to meaning and language 
changed the course of modern philosophy,1 once wrote: “Don’t for 
heavens sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay 
attention to your nonsense.”2 His exhortation is especially salient for 
 
 1. See Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 937, 938 (1990) (“It is the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein which is central to modern 
philosophy’s turn to language. For Wittgenstein, all philosophical problems are ultimately 
problems of language.”). 
 2. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 56e (G.H. von Wright ed., Peter 
Winch trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1980) (1977); see also Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & 
Oskari Kuusela, Introduction to WITTGENSTEIN AND HIS INTERPRETERS 32 n.23 (Guy Kahane, 
Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela eds., 2007) (“Saul Liberman . . . reportedly once 
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those interested in the scope of the First Amendment, because courts 
and scholars have often suggested that the Amendment’s terrain is 
defined by meaning,3 without doing much to show what meaning (or 
its absence, nonsense) actually means. As a result, the concept of 
meaning operates like a rogue boundary surveyor, erratically charting 
the First Amendment’s territory without judicial or scholarly 
accountability. 
This raises a variety of interesting and difficult questions. If 
meaning establishes the boundaries of the First Amendment, then 
what are we to make of nonsense—“words or language having no 
meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas”?4 If the Supreme Court is 
right that the Amendment’s “constitutional safeguard . . . ‘was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people,’”5 then 
speech lacking such ideas—assuming that it is actually “speech”6—
would not seem to merit constitutional coverage at all.7 That would be 
 
introduced a 1940s lecture by the famous Kabbalah scholar Gershom Scholem with the words 
‘Nonsense is nonsense—but the history of nonsense is scholarship.’”). 
 3. See, e.g., John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2008) 
(“Frequently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ or 
‘information.’”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 61 (1973) (“The crucial question under the first amendment 
is simply whether meaningful symbols of any type are being employed by one who wishes to 
communicate to others.”); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of 
“Speech,” 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1559 (“[T]he first requirement for communication by conduct 
is that the conduct be meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. This is simply an 
extension of a basic principle of language: a speaker normally cannot use sounds to 
communicate unless the sounds have some meaning attached to them.”). 
 4.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 791 (10th ed. 1996); see also 
William Charlton, Nonsense, 17 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 346, 346 (1977) (“The notion of nonsense 
has been freely used by philosophers of this century, but no full or satisfactory account has been 
given of it. . . . The English word ‘nonsense’ seems to apply most appropriately to something 
which purports to have a sense or meaning, but does not in fact have one.”). 
 5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (emphasis added) (quoting Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see also Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 
(1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government 
censorship.”). 
 6. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 273 (1981) (“[T]he constitutional definition of the word ‘speech’ carves out 
a category that is not coextensive with the ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech.’”). I 
revisit this assumption below at notes 275–76 and accompanying text. 
 7. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 606 
(“Speech that is not intended to communicate a substantive message or that is directed solely to 
noncognitive capacities may be wholly or largely without the properties that give speech its 
special status.”). My goal is to investigate whether nonsense falls within the First Amendment—
a question of coverage—not to establish the level of protection it should receive. See Frederick 
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a jarring conclusion indeed, which might explain why even those who 
treat meaning as an essential ingredient of speech tend to avoid it. 
This is perhaps most noticeable in the context of nonrepresentational 
art such as Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings and Lewis Carroll’s 
nonsense verse. The Supreme Court has reassuringly declared these 
to be “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment.8 But far 
from being unquestionable, their shielding in fact raises questions that 
are, as Mark Tushnet generously puts it, “quite difficult to answer 
satisfactorily.”9 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the difficulty of these 
questions is not the only cause for concern, and that artists—though 
they seem to have a special relationship with nonsense10—are not the 
only would-be speakers who should be keenly interested in the 
answers. This is true even if we focus exclusively on linguistic 
communication, which by many accounts is presumptively entitled to 
First Amendment coverage.11 Sometimes we speak without intending 
 
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional 
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (“[Q]uestions about the involvement of the First 
Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues 
surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech to which it 
applies.”). 
 8. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (“As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam))). 
 9. Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 170 (2012). 
 10. See id. at 169 (providing examples of artists denying the necessity of traditional 
meaning in their work, including Archibald MacLeish’s claim that “[a] poem should not mean 
but be,” ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, Ars Poetica, in COLLECTED POEMS 1917–1982, at 106, 107 
(1985), and William Carlos Williams’s refrain, “No ideas but in things,” 2 WILLIAM CARLOS 
WILLIAMS, A Sort of Song, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS 55 
(Christopher MacGowan ed., New Directions Books 2001)); see also Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-
Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1364 (1990) (noting that 
postmodern art “not only rejected the Modernist demand that art be ‘serious,’ it rejected the 
idea that art must have any traditional ‘value’ at all”); id. at 1367 (“[T]he 80’s has been the 
decade in which art that denies the value of art has become the most valuable art around.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Elizabeth Frank, Art’s Off-the-Wall Critic, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Nov. 19, 1989, at 47, 78)). 
 11. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) 
(“‘[P]ure speech’ . . . , we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under 
the First Amendment.”); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 192–99 (describing the attractions and perils 
of “nominalism,” which would focus on “words and word equivalents” as the starting point of 
First Amendment analysis). This Article focuses primarily on nonsensical language, rather than 
nonsensical conduct, because it seems to be well-accepted that conduct can be nonsensical, 
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to “mean” anything at all—exclamations, jokes, doggerel verse, and 
even philosophical illustrations may all be nonsensical.12 As 
Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them.”13 Other times, we are unaware of our own 
nonsense, either because we wrongly believe our propositions to be 
meaningful or because we are simply misunderstood.14 If meaning is a 
prerequisite for constitutional coverage, and much of what we say is 
meaningless without our ever knowing it, then the boundaries of the 
First Amendment are not only narrow but also unknown. 
Consider Morse v. Frederick,15 in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the suspension of a high school student who had unfurled a 
banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus school 
function.16 The Court conceded that the banner’s purported message 
“is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to 
others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all,”17 but 
concluded that the student’s suspension was “consistent with the First 
Amendment” because the banner “was reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use.”18 The student himself said, quite 
plausibly, that “the words were just nonsense meant to attract 
television cameras.”19 In dissent, Justice Stevens similarly concluded 
 
whereas the connection between language and nonsense has been largely unexplored. As noted 
in the Conclusion, the use-meaning approach would not extend First Amendment coverage to 
all linguistic communication.  
 12. See Charlton, supra note 4, at 346 (“It would normally be thought fairly damning to say 
of an utterance or a piece of writing ‘That is nonsense.’ Yet men of undoubted intelligence, like 
Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll, have devoted time and pains to writing what they admit is 
nonsense, and talking nonsense has been regarded as a conversational art.”). For a discussion of 
overt nonsense, see infra Part I.A.1. 
 13. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 6.54, at 189 (C.K. 
Ogden ed. & trans., 1922). Whether this is really what he intended (and whether he succeeded) 
is of course another matter. The “meaning” of the Tractatus’s avowed lack of sense has been an 
elusive and perhaps ephemeral grail for analytic philosophers. For a description of the debate 
over “ineffable” and “resolute” readings, see Leo K.C. Cheung, The Disenchantment of 
Nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 31 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 197, 201–03 
(2008), and infra notes 103–17. 
 14. For a discussion of covert nonsense, see infra Part I.A.2. 
 15. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
 16. Id. at 396–97. 
 17. Id. at 401. 
 18. Id. at 403, 409. 
 19. See id. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 
551 U.S. 393 (2007)). 
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that “[t]his is a nonsense message, not advocacy.”20 What if Stevens 
had commanded the majority? Would the student’s comments be 
unpunishable, or would they not count as speech at all? 
Simply to describe the broad scope of nonsense both 
demonstrates its importance and suggests that meaning is an 
unreliable guide to the First Amendment’s hinterlands.21 Moreover, 
meaning’s guidance would not necessarily be welcome even if it were 
accurate, because much nonsensical speech rests solidly on the 
normative foundations of the First Amendment—the values that the 
doctrine is created to protect.22 Primary among these are the 
marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, and democratic 
participation. Nonsense can and often does further each of them.23 
Part I thus sketches the terrain of nonsensical speech, and makes 
a preliminary case for its protection. In doing so, it uncovers a 
uniquely convenient entrance to the very depths of the First 
Amendment, shining light on the idea of meaning itself. Spelunking in 
this area is hazardous business, and Part II proceeds with caution. 
Despite the difficulties, the exploration is worthwhile, for First 
Amendment theory and doctrine often suggest that meaning is an 
essential element of constitutionally salient speech without defining 
 
 20. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 435 (referring to the “nonsense 
banner”).  
 21. I follow Robert Post’s lead by attempting to tell a story in which doctrine and 
normative commitments are interdependent. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, 
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 5 (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY] (“To determine the 
purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must consult the actual shape of entrenched 
First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free 
Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 618 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Reply] (“Because law 
typically acquires authority from the commitments and principles of those whom it seeks to 
govern, I have sought to identify this fundamental purpose by inquiring into our historical 
commitments and principles.” (footnote omitted) (citing Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring 
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007))). 
 22. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining 
What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011) (“[T]he answer to 
the question of what constitutes the freedom of speech depends on the conception one adopts, 
and one’s choice of conception is more analogous to a purely subjective preference than to a 
conclusion reached by a series of falsifiable steps.”). 
 23. For a discussion of the constitutional value of nonsense, see infra Part I.B. “Expression 
that is not intended to communicate anything may clearly promote the four values identified by 
[Thomas] Emerson as underlying the first amendment.” Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on 
Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 722 (1983). Emerson’s 
fourth value focuses on “[w]hether, although the conduct may not in itself qualify for special 
protection, such protection is necessary in order to safeguard other, qualified conduct.” Id. I 
discuss this argument below at notes 163–69 and accompanying text.  
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what meaning is or where it comes from. In other words, courts and 
free speech scholars have not explained what meaning means. 
Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have made meaning a 
primary target.24 Throughout the past century (paralleling almost 
exactly the lifespan of the modern First Amendment)25 they have 
developed two general methods for charting the boundaries of what 
can meaningfully be said. Their goal in doing so has been to find the 
limits of language, thought, and the world,26 not to generate 
constitutional doctrine. And yet the tools they have created—which 
with egregious but necessary oversimplification can be called 
“representational” meaning and “use” meaning—have been wielded, 
sometimes awkwardly and perhaps unknowingly, by the Justices 
themselves.27 
The representational approach finds meaning in the relationship 
between expression and underlying concepts.28 Some version of this 
basic idea underlies the logical positivism associated with thinkers 
like Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein in his early writings, among 
many others. Under the representational approach, speech that fails 
to represent extralinguistic ideas is simply nonsense and, if meaning is 
an essential ingredient of constitutionally salient speech, therefore 
falls outside the realm of the First Amendment. As Russell once put 
it, “Absorption in language sometimes leads to a neglect of the 
connexion of language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this 
connexion that gives meaning to words and significance to 
sentences.”29 
 
 24. See B.R. Tilghman, Literature, Philosophy and Nonsense, 30 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 256, 
256 (1990) (“[A] good case can be made that the notion of meaning and all it implies for the 
distinction between sense and nonsense has been the primary concern of twentieth-century 
philosophy, at least Anglo-American philosophy . . . .”).  
 25. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
1256, 1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the popular, albeit “crude,” view is that “the First 
Amendment started in 1919,” which was when Justice Holmes wrote his dissent in Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). 
 26. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 5.6, at 149 (“The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world.”).  
 27. Borrowing philosophers’ tools, with or without acknowledgement, would itself be 
nothing new for First Amendment doctrine. See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative 
Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 875–78 (1986) (tracing the 
First Amendment doctrine’s “philosophical origins” to John Milton, John Locke, John Stuart 
Mill, and others). 
 28. See infra Part II.A.  
 29. HERBERT HOCHBERG, Preface to INTRODUCING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: ITS SENSE 
AND ITS NONSENSE, 1879–2002 (2003) (quoting Russell). 
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A representational approach to meaning apparently animates 
many of the Supreme Court’s efforts to chart the boundaries of the 
freedom of speech, from the oft-repeated aphorism that “[t]he First 
Amendment . . . embodies ‘[o]ur profound national commitment to 
the free exchange of ideas’”30 to the Spence test, which asks whether 
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,” and 
whether “the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”31 The representational approach 
is also implicitly employed by those who fret about the constitutional 
protection of nonrepresentational art.32 Nonrepresentationalism, after 
all, is only problematic for the First Amendment if representativeness 
itself is constitutionally relevant. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the representational approach is 
defective as a constitutional principle. Requiring speech acts to 
represent ideas would exclude nearly all of the potentially valuable 
nonsense described in Part I, including vast stretches of discourse 
regarding ethics, aesthetics, and religion.33 On the representational 
account, they simply “cannot be expressed,”34 and thus “the tendency 
of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to 
run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls 
of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless.”35 Fortunately, the First 
Amendment is not so limited; the boundaries of the freedom of 
speech are not coextensive with the “walls of our cage.” 
 
 30. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)); see also Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social 
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate 
of opinion—have the full protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties . . . .” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))). 
 31. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). In Rumsfeld v. Forum 
for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court suggested that the 
message must be “created by the conduct itself,” not “by the speech that accompanies it.” Id. at 
66. 
 32. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 3, at 35 (“It would be shocking to conclude that 
symphonic compositions or nonrepresentational art could be the subject of governmental 
censorship. Both are fully within the ambit of the first amendment notwithstanding their lack of 
both verbal and cognitive content.”). 
 33. See infra Part I.B. 
 34. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.421, at 183. 
 35. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Ethics, Life and Faith, in THE WITTGENSTEIN READER 251, 
258 (Anthony Kenny ed., 2d ed. 2006); see also James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral 
Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 519 (1999) (discussing 
this passage). 
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In part to escape that cage, much of analytic philosophy took 
what is known as the “linguistic turn.”36 That development, which is 
closely associated with Wittgenstein’s later work, speech-act theory, 
and ordinary-language philosophy, generally holds that “[t]he bounds 
of sense, as it were, are all within language, and meaning is nowhere 
other than in the many activities in which human beings use their 
various languages.”37 As Wittgenstein explained, “For a large class of 
cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it 
can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.”38 Finding the boundaries of meaning, then, depends on 
identifying the “language-games” that “consist[] of language and the 
actions into which it is woven.”39 
Echoes of a use-meaning approach can already be found in First 
Amendment discourse and doctrine. The use-meaning approach 
explains the Court’s conclusion that constitutional coverage extends 
to practices that form a “significant medium for the communication of 
ideas,”40 and is not “confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message.’”41 One can also find the influence of such an 
approach in First Amendment scholarship, perhaps most prominently 
and thoughtfully in Robert Post’s argument that First Amendment 
values “do not attach to abstract acts of communication as such, but 
rather to the social contexts that envelop and give constitutional 
significance to acts of communication.”42 
 
 36. See Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 
1854–55 (1994) (“The legacy of philosophy from the middle of this century to the present has 
been the systematic replacement of foundationalist epistemology with holism, the substitution 
of referential theories of language with an emphasis on speech as action, and a general 
movement away from the individual as the foundation of empirical, linguistic, and moral 
judgment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 37. Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 303–04 
(1993) (book review); see also Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 177 
(1985) (“Conventionalism is a viewpoint, most closely associated with the later writings of 
Wittgenstein, that emphasizes practice and context. It holds, for example, that we understand a 
concept not when we grasp some fact, but when we can successfully use that concept within a 
language game or a defined context, and that truth is a function of the agreement of those 
participating within a practice rather than the other way around.” (footnote omitted)). 
 38. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1969) (1953). 
 39. Id. § 7. 
 40. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
 41. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam)). 
 42. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 
(1995); see also id. at 1276–77 (“Instead of aspiring to articulate abstract characteristics of 
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The use-meaning approach improves on the representational 
approach both descriptively and normatively. It accounts for the 
constitutional value in various forms of nonsense, captures the 
contextual and socially embedded nature of language, and provides 
better answers to thorny problems like the constitutional status of art. 
Under the use-meaning approach, “Jabberwocky” is protected by the 
First Amendment not because its words represent concepts, but 
because it is recognizable as a poem. By contrast, those acts and 
utterances that violate the rules of our language games simply do not 
count as meaningful speech, even if they represent facts or concepts 
and would therefore be meaningful under the representational 
approach.43 
The Article thus concludes by endorsing the First Amendment’s 
linguistic turn and its effort to find meaning in use, rather than in the 
relationship of language to concepts. Making the most of such an 
approach, however, is no simple task.44 As Professors Jack Balkin and 
Sandy Levinson put it, language games “refuse clear-cut boundaries, 
they borrow and steal from other sources, they overlap with other 
language games, and their governing rules are always in a state of flux 
and disputation. Lived language games are unruly and unkempt, 
untamed and untidy, much as life itself is.”45 But if the First 
Amendment’s boundaries depend on them, then such games must be 
tamed. Doctrine must provide guidance; it must be able to identify 
the First Amendment language games that create the kind of meaning 
the Constitution requires. The use-meaning approach does not 
provide easy answers to these problems, but it does provide a better 
set of questions with which to address them. 
 
speech, doctrine ought to identify discrete forms of social order that are imbued with 
constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the ways in which speech facilitates 
that constitutional value.”). My goal here is, in part, to show that one potential “abstract 
characteristic[] of speech”—meaning—is in fact derived from “discrete forms of social order.” 
See id. at 1276–77. 
 43. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771–75 
(2001) (considering the hypothetical First Amendment claims of a person who protests speed 
limits by violating them).  
 44. See infra Part II.C. 
 45. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1802 
(1994); see also WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 65 (“Instead of producing something common 
to all that we call language, I am saying that [language games] have no one thing in common 
which makes us use the same word for all,—but that they are related to one another in many 
different ways.”).  
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I.  STUFF AND NONSENSE 
Making sense of nonsense for First Amendment purposes 
involves at least two tasks: establishing what nonsense is and 
determining whether it has constitutional value.46 This Part attempts 
to accomplish both, first sketching the landscape of meaningless 
speech and then showing how that nonsense relates to the basic 
values traditionally associated with the First Amendment. The 
discussion therefore not only describes the scope and value of 
nonsense, but also delivers a preliminary case for its constitutional 
protection and opens the door for Part II’s exploration of the concept 
of meaning itself. 
Part I.A begins by describing nonsense’s broad domain. 
Traditionally, it has been thought that boundary disputes between 
meaning and nonsense are primarily relevant to the First Amendment 
in the context of artistic expression, and that a capacious view of art 
can more or less solve the problem. But nonsense contains 
multitudes, and not all of its forms are easily recognizable as such. 
The very breadth of nonsense demonstrates the importance of 
explaining it, and also suggests that, unless the First Amendment has 
been radically misunderstood, the Constitution covers at least some 
of this meaningless speech. 
As a matter of doctrine, however, it is not particularly satisfying 
to say that nonsense must be protected by the Constitution because 
there is so much of it. To merit coverage, nonsense must presumably 
further the values traditionally associated with the First 
Amendment,47 such as the marketplace of ideas, autonomy, and 
democracy. Part I.B argues that nonsense does exactly that, 
advancing the autonomous search for unsayable truths, contributing 
to cognitive advancement despite lacking “meaning” of its own, and 
even providing valuable outlets for political dissent. It follows that the 
First Amendment must make room for nonsense, as Part II argues in 
more detail. 
 
 46. One might also ask whether nonsense can be “speech,” but I will assume an affirmative 
answer for now and return to that issue below. See infra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
 47. See POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 4 (“The actual contours of First Amendment 
doctrine cannot be explained merely by facts in the world; they must instead reflect the law’s 
efforts to achieve constitutional values.”). 
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A. The Definition and Scope of Nonsense 
Whatever else it suggests, Wittgenstein’s admonition to “pay 
attention to your nonsense”48 was a call to recognize nonsense when it 
arises. That is a difficult but rewarding task, for nonsense takes many 
forms.49 Because the goal of this discussion is to have constitutional 
reasoning drive conceptual analysis rather than the other way around, 
this Section evaluates the scope and constitutional value of nonsense 
in general terms before elaborating a more rigorous definition of 
meaning in Part II. The downside of this approach is that it is, as an 
initial matter, overexpansive: Pollock’s paintings, for example, are 
usually seen as nonrepresentational and therefore qualify as a certain 
kind of nonsense, despite their undoubted value and First 
Amendment protection. Indeed, the point of the following discussion 
is to develop an appropriate definition of meaning based on an 
understanding of what it would exclude. And at least as an initial 
matter, it is not enough to simply posit that meaning is different from 
propositional content, for much First Amendment scholarship and 
doctrine makes precisely that connection.50 
In an effort to impose some order, the following discussion 
divides nonsense—“[w]ords or language having no meaning or 
intelligible ideas”51—into two major categories: overt and covert.52 
 
 48. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 56e.  
 49. See Charlton, supra note 4, at 346 (“In general philosophers have gone wrong in 
supposing that whatever is nonsensical is nonsensical in the same way.”). 
 50. See infra notes 170–72, 205–17 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Nonsense, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nonsense (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (defining 
“nonsense” as “spoken or written words that have no meaning or make no sense”). 
 52. It would be perfectly plausible to slice nonsense in other ways, however—between 
purposeful and accidental, substantial and mere, illuminating and misleading, and so on. Oskari 
Kuusela, Nonsense and Clarification in the Tractatus—Resolute and Ineffability Readings and the 
Tractatus’ Failure, 80 ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA 35, 37 (2006) (distinguishing “between 
misleading and illuminating nonsense” by noting that “[t]he former is unself-conscious nonsense 
attempting to say what can only be shown,” whereas “[t]he latter is self-conscious nonsense 
intended to reveal its own nonsensicalness”). 
  The two approaches to meaning discussed in Part II also suggest their own definitions 
of nonsense; indeed, the Article concludes by arguing that “representational” nonsense is 
constitutionally protected, whereas “use” nonsense is not. Because that argument is dependent 
in part on the fact that the former would include—and therefore exclude from constitutional 
coverage—so much everyday nonsense, it is better to start with a more general definition of 
nonsense.  
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1. Overt Nonsense.  At almost the same time that Russell and 
Wittgenstein were busy in Cambridge trying to pin down nonsense, 
Carroll was busy in Oxford generating more of it. “Jabberwocky,” 
perhaps his most famous piece of nonsense verse (and a cameo 
performer in First Amendment doctrine53), begins: “’Twas brillig, and 
the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wade; / All mimsy were 
the borogoves, / And the mome raths outgrabe.”54 As far as the 
average reader can tell,55 these are symbols with no references; 
“sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing.”56 As such, they are overt 
nonsense.57 
Neither the speaker nor the hearer of overt nonsense believes it 
to have meaning. Its lack of meaning is thus both intentional and 
apparent.58 Some overt nonsense is fanciful, in that it does not purport 
to convey meaning, but rather is designed to create a sense of 
amusement or delight in the listener. People seem to enjoy such 
nonsense for the same reasons that babies gurgle at a novel 
stimulus—it provides a sense of wonder, possibility, and absurdity. 
But overt nonsense need not have some instrumental reason for 
existence; it can simply be nonsense for nonsense’s sake.59 
Much artistic expression is overtly and sometimes avowedly 
nonsensical. In his thoughtful analysis of nonrepresentational art, 
Tushnet points out that many artists—from Archibald MacLeish to 
 
 53. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995). “Jabberwocky” is perhaps the most famous of Carroll’s nonsense, but it is by no 
means the only example. See, e.g., LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 
134 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1869) (1865) (“Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than 
what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than 
what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.”). 
 54. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
21 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1872). 
 55. Carroll and Humpty Dumpty—his avatar of nonsense—later provided a glossary of 
terms. See infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text. 
 56. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5. 
 57. See Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37 (describing Peter Hacker’s view of overt nonsense); 
see also P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
WITTGENSTEIN 18–19 (rev. ed. 1986) (distinguishing overt and covert nonsense). 
 58. William Charlton refers to something like this when he discusses “factual” nonsense: 
“An utterance is factual nonsense if a person uttering it cannot mean what he says without 
ignoring plain facts, or what are taken to be plain facts.” See Charlton, supra note 4, at 352 
(distinguishing “factual” from “grammatical” and “logical” nonsense). 
 59. See id. at 355 (“A man could not, of course, compose what he knows is nonsense 
without having a purpose of some sort. But he need have no ulterior purpose, no reason for 
writing what he writes except that it is nonsense. Lear and Carroll, at least, seem to have written 
nonsense for its own sake in this way.”). 
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William Carlos Williams—have denied the need for, or the 
desirability of, a direct connection between art and traditional 
meaning.60 As Williams put it, “A poem should not mean but be.”61 
Charles Rosen makes a similar point in the context of literary style: 
We should recall here the extraordinary sixteenth-century 
controversy about style between the admirers of Cicero and of 
Erasmus, the former, led by Étienne Dolet, believing that style had a 
beauty independent of the matter of the literary work, and the latter 
insisting that the beauty of style was wholly dependent on its 
consonance with meaning.62 
Of course, one need not look that far to find examples of art that 
overtly lacks representational meaning. Consider the lyrics of popular 
songs, from “I Am the Walrus”63 to “Who Put the Bomp”64 to “Louie 
Louie”65 to those consisting entirely of gibberish.66 
The relationship between overt nonsense and art is not 
monogamous, however. Philosophers and linguists frequently rely on 
overt nonsense as an analytic instrument.67 The Tractatus, for 
example, openly proclaims itself to lack meaning.68 Philosophers A.W. 
 
 60. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 169. 
 61. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 55. 
 62. CHARLES ROSEN, Freedom and Art, in FREEDOM AND THE ARTS: ESSAYS ON MUSIC 
AND LITERATURE 8–9 (2012). 
 63. See THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records 
1967) (“Semolina pilchards climbing up the Eiffel Tower / Elementary penguin singing Hare 
Krishna / Man you should have seen them / Kicking Edgar Allen Poe”); see also THE BEATLES, 
Come Together, on ABBEY ROAD (Capitol Records 1969) (“He bag production / He got walrus 
gumboot / He got Ono sideboard / He one spinal cracker”).  
 64. Barry Mann & Gerry Goffin, Who Put the Bomp, on BARRY MANN, WHO PUT THE 
BOMP (ABC-Paramount 1961) (“When my baby heard / ‘Bomp bah bah bomp’ / ‘Bah bomp 
bah bomp bah’ / Every word went right into her heart.”). 
 65. THE KINGSMEN, Louie, Louie, on THE KINGSMEN IN PERSON (Wand Records 1963); 
see also Eric Predoehl, A Short History of Louie Louie, LOUIELOUIE.NET (1999), 
http://www.louielouie.net/06-history.htm (noting that the inscrutable song has “been called 
everything from a musical joke, pure garbage, the dumbest song ever written, to the 
quintessential pop single,” and that the FBI actually investigated the lyrics to determine 
whether they are obscene). 
 66. ADRIANO CELENTANO, Prisencolinensinainciusol, on NOSTALROCK (Italdisc 1973) 
(consisting of “lyrics” that mimic what American English sounds like to an Italian-speaking 
listener). 
 67. Cf. Charlton, supra note 4, at 347 (“Unless they wish to illustrate a philosophic point 
people seldom compose total nonsense on purpose.”). 
 68. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.54, at 189 (“My propositions are elucidatory in 
this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless . . . .”). Wittgenstein’s use 
of the word “senseless” rather than “nonsense” is significant, because he posited a difference 
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Moore and Peter Sullivan explain that Wittgenstein had no choice but 
to use nonsense to demonstrate the boundaries of meaning itself: 
The Tractatus consists mostly of nonsense because what 
Wittgenstein is trying to convey, about language and its limits, is, by 
its own lights, ineffable. The only way in which he can convey it—
the only way in which he can get the reader to ‘see the world 
aright’—is by dint of a special kind of nonsense: what we might call 
‘illuminating’ nonsense.69 
Unsurprisingly, many linguists have taken a similar approach. In 
his dissertation, for example, Noam Chomsky set out to demonstrate 
among other things that a sentence can be grammatically correct and 
yet lack semantic meaning. His famous example was the phrase 
“[c]olorless green ideas sleep furiously.”70 
2. Covert Nonsense.  Whereas the meaninglessness of overt 
nonsense is self-conscious71 and apparent to speaker and hearer alike, 
covert nonsense is potentially more insidious. It arises when speakers 
or hearers (or both) incorrectly believe that they are successfully 
exchanging meaningful ideas. 
Perhaps the most common type of covert nonsense is the 
straightforward misunderstanding, in which speaker and hearer 
disagree about the specific meaning of a particular speech act, or even 
about whether the purported speech act has meaning at all. This 
Section does not attempt to fully address the relationship between 
misunderstandings and the freedom of speech—an interesting issue in 
 
between the two. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, there is no need to make 
such a fine distinction: both “senseless” and “nonsense” involve a lack of meaning. See Anat 
Biletzki & Anat Matar, Ludwig Wittgenstein, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Dec. 23, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Wittgenstein (“The characteristic of being 
senseless applies not only to the propositions of logic but also to other things that cannot be 
represented, such as mathematics or the pictorial form itself of the pictures that do represent. 
These are, like tautologies and contradictions, literally sense-less, they have no sense. Beyond, 
or aside from, senseless propositions Wittgenstein identifies another group of statements which 
cannot carry sense: the nonsensical (unsinnig) propositions. Nonsense, as opposed to 
senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more radically devoid of meaning, 
when it transcends the bounds of sense.”). 
 69. A.W. Moore & Peter Sullivan, Ineffability and Nonsense, 77 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN 
SOC’Y (SUPP.) 169, 179 (2003). As Wittgenstein explained, the aim of the Tractatus was to “draw 
a limit to thinking,” which “can . . . only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of 
the limit will be simply nonsense.” WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 27. 
 70. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (1957). I am indebted to David Blocher 
for the example.  
 71. Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37. 
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its own right—but rather tries to identify the particular problems that 
misunderstandings pose for meaning-dependent approaches to the 
First Amendment. 
Simple misunderstandings occur when the speaker intends one 
meaning and the listener hears another. Such situations are, of course, 
extremely common, but some approaches to the definition of 
speech—taken at face value—might exclude them.72 Carroll’s poetry 
and Pollock’s paintings are “unquestionably shielded” by the First 
Amendment,73 but one might reasonably ask whether many people 
“understand” them. For that matter, one could ask the same of 
Finnegan’s Wake, Matthew Barney’s movies, or any number of other 
impenetrable artistic works. So, too, are few listeners able to 
understand the specific meanings of most scientific, scholarly, or even 
legal speech. And it would be troubling, to say the least, if discussions 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities or the Higgs boson—or professors’ 
efforts to teach them—lack First Amendment protection simply 
because so few people comprehend them. 
But misunderstandings can be more complicated. In addition to 
disagreeing about what meaning is conveyed by a purported speech 
act, people sometimes disagree about whether the act is meaningful at 
all. Such deep misunderstandings arise in at least two ways, which can 
with some oversimplification be called “lost meaning” and “found 
meaning.” The former occurs when a speaker intends to convey 
meaning and the listener fails to recognize not only the specific 
meaning, but also the nature of the act as meaningful. In other words, 
the listener does not even perceive the purported speech act as an 
effort to communicate meaning. Consider a computer programmer 
who expresses herself in code. A nonprogrammer might not only fail 
 
 72. Cf., e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[The Court] cannot accept 
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the 
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”); Nimmer, supra note 3, at 
37 (concluding that “symbolic speech requires not merely that given conduct results in a 
meaning effect, but that the actor causing such conduct must intend such a meaning effect by his 
conduct”). To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these authorities would actually exclude 
misunderstandings from the First Amendment, only that their approaches seem to do so, as 
stated. Nimmer, for example, not only posited that a “meaning effect” was necessary for 
symbolic speech, but also that the Amendment covered speech lacking “both verbal and 
cognitive content.” Id. at 35–36. 
 73. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995).  
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to understand the code’s specific meaning, but also fail to understand 
that it contains meaning at all.74 
Found meaning, by contrast, arises when a listener imputes 
meaning to an act when the putative speaker never meant to convey 
any. First Amendment theory and doctrine have not focused 
extensively on the possibility of found meaning, but interesting 
hypotheticals easily come to mind. Imagine, for example, that a 
person sees a famous pianist sitting on a bench at her piano. The 
performer is simply taking a break, thinking about a recent vacation. 
The starstruck and credulous viewer, however, imagines that she is 
trying out a new performance of John Cage’s 4’33”, which consists of 
four and a half minutes of not playing.75 The viewer has discovered 
meaning and imputed it to the daydreaming pianist, but no volitional 
speech has occurred. One could even stipulate that the person on the 
bench is not a pianist at all, but a janitor resting after her shift. Or 
imagine a traveler strolling in a foreign country, singing the 
supposedly nonsensical words of his favorite Beatles song. Little does 
he know that in the country he is visiting, “semolina pilchards”76 is a 
grievous and actionable insult. Is the janitor or the tourist “speaking” 
for First Amendment purposes, notwithstanding the fact that neither 
intends to communicate any meaning? 
First Amendment theory and doctrine do not provide satisfying 
answers as to whether such unintentional speech is constitutionally 
covered.77 Denying constitutional coverage to unintended speech 
could leave out a wide range of speakers who cannot control their 
speech acts—those who are coerced or asleep, for example. A person 
 
 74. Cf. Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Communication does not lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is 
expressed in the language of computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores are 
written in ‘code,’ i.e., symbolic notations not comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet both are 
covered by the First Amendment.”). 
 75. JOHN CAGE, 4’33” (1952); see MICHAEL NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC: CAGE AND 
BEYOND 11 (2d ed. 1999) (“[The piece’s] first and most famous performance was given by a 
pianist (David Tudor) . . . . Tudor, seated in the normal fashion on a stool in front of the piano, 
did nothing more nor less than silently close the keyboard lid at the beginning of, and raise it at 
the end of each time period.”). 
 76. See THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records 
1967). 
 77. Most likely, neither the pianist, janitor, nor tourist could raise First Amendment claims, 
given the requirement in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S 405 (1974), of “intent to convey a 
particularized message.” Id. at 410–11. In Mental States and Constitutional Rights (work in 
progress), I consider in some detail whether constitutional rights do or should have act and 
mental state requirements analogous to those found in tort and criminal law. 
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with Tourette Syndrome may have involuntary verbal tics that can 
include a wide variety of “vocalizations,” from “grunting, throat 
clearing, shouting and barking” to “socially inappropriate words and 
phrases.”78 If such a person were to involuntarily utter an actionable 
threat or libel, shouldn’t she be able to raise the First Amendment as 
a defense? On the one hand, Tushnet persuasively suggests that a 
“‘reasonable’ imputation of meaning to otherwise meaningless 
words—or symbols—is sufficient to trigger First Amendment 
coverage.”79 On the other hand, treating involuntary acts as 
meaningful speech implies that the people who “spoke” them can be 
held responsible for meaning they never intended to convey. 
Transforming their nonsense into speech will not always work to their 
advantage, as the student in Morse v. Frederick learned.80 
Finally, covert nonsense can arise when both speaker and hearer 
incorrectly believe that they have communicated meaningful ideas. 
Even though the parties think they are engaged in communication, 
their words actually lack meaning.81 This sounds far-fetched, but 
according to some accounts of meaning it happens more often than 
we might like to think. To a representationalist, for example, 
language is meaningful only when it refers to some extralinguistic 
fact,82 and a great deal of everyday speech fails this test. Wittgenstein 
himself believed, at least in his early writing, that aesthetics, ethics, 
and theology “cannot be expressed,”83 and are therefore nonsensical. 
 
 78. What Is Tourette Syndrome?, NAT’L TOURETTE SYNDROME ASS’N, http://www.tsa-
usa.org/aMedical/whatists.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 79. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 198; see also id. at 215 (“Taken together with Hurley and 
Cohen, Humanitarian Law Project implies that any activity that enough people regard as having 
some meaning, noncognitive as well as cognitive, must survive the highest level of scrutiny . . . .” 
(citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971))). 
 80. See supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text. 
 81. Cf. Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37 (“[W]e can draw a . . . distinction between misleading 
and illuminating nonsense. The former is unself-conscious nonsense attempting to say what can 
only be shown. The latter is self-conscious nonsense intended to reveal its own 
nonsensicalness.”).  
 82. For a description of the representational approach, see infra Part II.A. 
 83. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, §§ 6.42–6.421, at 183 (“Hence also there can be no 
ethical propositions. . . . [E]thics cannot be expressed.”); see also id. § 4.003, at 63 (“Most 
propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, 
but senseless.”); Gregory S. Kavka, Wittgensteinian Political Theory, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1455, 
1458 n.7 (1974) (reviewing HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE: ON THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1972)) 
(“Since . . . Wittgenstein holds that propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and religion are not 
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But of course they are also enormously significant—many people 
regard such matters as the very lifeblood of public discourse. 
The idea of covert nonsense is somewhat unsettling; its apparent 
scope is downright disturbing. If much of what we say is nonsensical 
without our even realizing it, then the boundaries of the First 
Amendment are not only narrow but unknown. Any time we fail to 
give meaning to our propositions, despite our best efforts and despite 
believing that we have done so, we are operating outside of 
constitutional coverage. 
B. The Constitutional Value of Nonsense 
Simply describing the broad scope of nonsense demonstrates that 
the representational-meaning approach provides a poor map of the 
First Amendment’s actual boundaries. That is, the Constitution 
undoubtedly does cover much of the nonsensical speech discussed in 
the previous Section, notwithstanding its lack of representational 
content. And there must be some reason for this; it is unsatisfying to 
say that nonsense should be protected by the First Amendment 
simply because it is plentiful. Appealing as that conclusion might be, 
it is normatively defensible only if nonsense serves relevant 
constitutional values such as the marketplace of ideas, individual 
autonomy, and democracy.84 The following discussion attempts to 
show that nonsense is in fact an important means of furthering each 
of those values. 
1. The Marketplace of Ideas.  The model of the marketplace of 
ideas—the first85 and perhaps still most prominent86 First Amendment 
 
amenable to such analysis, he concludes that such propositions lack cognitive significance. This 
does not mean that Wittgenstein regards the propositions of aesthetics, ethics, and religion as 
worthless—such propositions are strictly speaking nonsensical, yet they possess a kind of 
mystical significance for they try to express that which is important but linguistically 
inexpressible.” (citation omitted)). 
 84. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only free speech principles, nor that we 
must choose only one of them. Cf. Post, supra note 42, at 1271 (“There is in fact no general free 
speech principle . . . .”). 
 85. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000). 
 86. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that 
establishing truth through a marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test” but that “[t]here 
is no other”); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 
823–25 (2008) (“This [marketplace of ideas] theory provided the first justification for a broad 
freedom of expression commensurate with the sweeping language of the First Amendment 
itself.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
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theory—rests on the notion that, if left unregulated, good ideas will 
eventually win out over bad ones. In American law, the theory is 
traced to Justice Holmes’s argument that “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”87 Importantly, the truths that the marketplace can 
supposedly uncover are not narrowly defined, and can include 
political and ethical insights as well as empirical facts.88 As Justice 
Brandeis put it in his own statement of the marketplace rationale, 
“[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”89 
Inasmuch as nonsense represents a disconnect between words 
and ideas,90 it seems out of place in a marketplace devoted exclusively 
to the latter—especially when ideas are valuable only as handmaidens 
to truth.91 This is particularly apparent under some conceptions of 
“truth” itself. Just as some analytic approaches find meaning in the 
relationship between language and extralinguistic facts,92 so too does 
the correspondence theory of truth hold that statements are true 
when they represent “actual” extralinguistic facts.93 As Russell 
 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oft-
repeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to 
ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”).  
 87. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45 
(H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644) (“Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”). 
 88. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“These test-related distinctions reflect the constitutional importance of maintaining a free 
marketplace of ideas, a marketplace that provides access to ‘social, political, esthetic, moral, and 
other ideas and experiences.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))). 
 89. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 90. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 791 (defining 
“nonsense” as “words or language having no meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas”). 
 91. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the 
Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 241 (“The [marketplace] theory’s 
emphasis on ideas, however, is troubling, and has the potential for making the first amendment 
value of art derivative. To the extent that the concept of ideas refers to intellectual and 
cognitive processes, it does not take account of the noncognitive and emotional aspects of 
communication which often accompany artistic expression, especially of the 
nonrepresentational kind.”); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 205 (“What ‘idea’ does Jackson Pollock’s 
Blue Poles: No.11 convey? Even more, what idea does Ulysses convey?”); cf. Brandt v. Bd. of 
Educ., 480 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Self expression is not to be equated to the expression 
of ideas or opinions and thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace.”). 
 92. See infra Part II.A. 
 93. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 84 (Arc Manor 2008) 
(1912).  
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explained, “[A] belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and 
is false when there is no corresponding fact.”94 A statement that does 
not correspond to a fact therefore seems meaningless under a formal 
approach to meaning, and false under a correspondence theory of 
truth. If meaningless statements do not even refer to extralinguistic 
facts, how can they possibly promote the intellectual search for those 
facts? 
But such an argument unfairly oversimplifies both the normative 
vision of the marketplace model and the potential cognitive value of 
nonsense. As to the former, even the harshest critics of the 
marketplace model do not envision it being animated solely by a 
correspondence theory of truth. Under the marketplace approach, the 
value of free speech extends beyond the accurate identification of 
facts. Instead, the vision seems to be of what is called a “coherence” 
theory of truth, one that identifies as true that which people, through 
open discussion, come to regard as such.95 The First Amendment 
generally shies away from legally enforceable determinations about 
what is “really” true, at least with regard to speech in public 
discourse.96 
Even if one thinks that the First Amendment is concerned only 
with the conveyance of true facts, it is apparent that doctrine 
embodies a kind of “epistemological humility” on the part of 
government.97 The reasons for this are easy enough to perceive, and 
they suggest that nonsense may be entitled to protection under a 
marketplace theory. One such reason is a general distrust of 
 
 94. Id. at 85. 
 95. See Paul G. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
157, 167 (1980) (noting that, under the modern analytic approach, “there is no simple or certain 
way to know the meanings of words and sentences; even their ‘truth’ depends on the game in 
which they are used”). There is of course a danger of tautology here, one that reemerges in 
efforts to define as “speech” that which people recognize as such. Cf. Post, supra note 85, at 
2366 (“In the absence of such a morality [of public debate], it is merely tautological to presume 
that truth is what most people come to believe after open discussion.”). 
 96. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment 
recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 
(1974))). As Post notes, the Court has also said that “there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.” POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 29 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340); 
see id. at 29–31, 43–47 (suggesting that the distinction can be explained based on whether the 
purportedly false statements are part of public discourse); see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 
S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 
Stat. 3266 (2006), which criminalized lies about certain military medals).  
 97. Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican 
Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 271 (1991). 
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government officials determining the meaning of private speech.98 
That is, if the marketplace model requires judges to be agnostic as to 
truthfulness, it seems that they should also be agnostic as to 
meaningfulness. 
Some version of this concern has arisen in the context of art, with 
many judges and scholars arguing that judges are not well-suited to 
determine art’s meaning, value, or even existence. As Justice Holmes 
once put it, judging the value of art is a “dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law.”99 If we do not trust judges to identify 
which of many possible meanings a work of art conveys, why would 
we trust them to identify whether it conveys meaning at all? Imbuing 
meaning where none is intended can distort speech just as much as 
other forms of misunderstanding. Consider again Carroll’s verse. 
Some believe “Jabberwocky” to be overtly nonsensical, as suggested 
above.100 Others suggest, to the contrary, that the poem represents not 
 
 98. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
2 (1989) (“Not only the first amendment, but also the very idea of a principle of freedom of 
speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of decisionmakers.”); see also Vincent Blasi, 
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985) 
(theorizing that in interpreting the First Amendment courts’ “overriding objective at all times 
should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when 
intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and 
most likely to stifle dissent systematically”). 
 99. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Miller v. 
Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(“[A First Amendment claim regarding nude dancing] strikes judges as ridiculous in part 
because most of us are either middle-aged or elderly men, in part because we tend to be snooty 
about popular culture, in part because as public officials we have a natural tendency to think 
political expression more important than artistic expression, in part because we are 
Americans—which means that we have been raised in a culture in which puritanism, 
philistinism, and promiscuity are complexly and often incongruously interwoven—and in part 
because like all lawyers we are formalists who believe deep down that the words in statutes and 
the Constitution mean what they say, and a striptease is not speech.”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
  The question has also proven difficult for persons not “trained only to the law,” as 
Jeremy Waldron points out: “What [art critics] find is that they cannot agree about the 
definition of ‘art.’” Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical 
Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 530–31 (1994). 
 100. See Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through 
Pseudocommunication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (“Jabberwocky has no meaning, at least 
that an adult audience could discern.”). Indeed, the word “Jabberwocky” has come to be used 
as a synonym for mere nonsense. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual 
Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1478 (2010) (“The artistic solution, in effect, is the 
expression, or vehicle, for the themes, meaning, and emotion essential to the found artistic 
problem. Without it, artistic expression becomes nothing more than Jabberwocky.”). 
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nonsense, but a purposeful and illustrative distortion of sense.101 Who 
are judges to determine which of these is the better interpretation of 
Carroll? 
Nonsense—overt and otherwise—can also be a useful, perhaps 
even essential, tool in illuminating certain kinds of truth.102 Consider 
again (and again and again) the Tractatus. What is the truth value of a 
book that proclaims itself to be nonsensical? That question has 
bedeviled and divided philosophers for the better part of a century,103 
and although no clear victor has emerged, their efforts demonstrate 
that nonsense can play a unique and important role in the intellectual 
marketplace. 
The battle lines of the Tractarian debate are currently drawn 
between what have been called the “ineffable” and the “resolute” 
readings. The former, represented prominently by Russell and Peter 
Hacker, holds that “there are, according to the author of the 
Tractatus, ineffable truths that can be apprehended.”104 As Russell put 
it in his introduction to the Tractatus, “[A]fter all, Mr [sic] 
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, 
thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly there may be 
some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other 
exit.”105 And as Hacker points out, “That there are things that cannot 
be put into words, but which make themselves manifest is a leitmotif 
 
 101. See generally, e.g., Peter J. Lucas, From Jabberwocky Back to Old English: Nonsense, 
Anglo-Saxon and Oxford, in 1 LANGUAGE HISTORY AND LINGUISTIC MODELLING 503 
(Raymond Hickey & Stainsław Puppel eds., 1997). 
 102. See Kuusela, supra note 52, at 37.  
 103. See Biletzki & Matar, supra note 68 (“‘Nonsense’ has become the hinge of 
Wittgensteinian interpretative discussion during the last decade of the 20th century. Beyond the 
bounds of language lies nonsense—propositions which cannot picture anything—and 
Wittgenstein bans traditional metaphysics to that area. The quandary arises concerning the 
question of what it is that inhabits that realm of nonsense, since Wittgenstein does seem to be 
saying that there is something there to be shown (rather than said) and does, indeed, 
characterize it as the ‘mystical.’”). 
 104. P.M.S. Hacker, Was He Trying To Whistle It?, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN 353, 368 
(Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000). The reference in Hacker’s title is to a remark by 
Wittgenstein’s friend, the Cambridge mathematician Frank Ramsey, who wrote that if 
Wittgenstein was right, “we must then take seriously that [philosophy] is nonsense, and not 
pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense!” FRANK PLUMPTON RAMSEY, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 263 (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1931). Connecting the famous 
final line of the Tractatus to Wittgenstein’s well-known habit, Ramsey wrote, “But what we 
can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.” Id. at 238. 
 105. See Bertrand Russell, Introduction to WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 7, 22 
(referencing the seventh and final section of the Tractatus). 
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running through the whole of the Tractatus.”106 According to the 
ineffable reading, Wittgenstein’s goal was to help us see these things 
“aright,” and then to discard the apparatus that helped us to do so.107 
The book itself is overt nonsense (or at least aims to be, for those who 
understand it) but still manages to convey meaning. 
The “resolute,” or “austere,” reading, most closely associated 
with James Conant and Cora Diamond,108 rejects the notion that there 
are unsayable truths, or different kinds of nonsense.109 According to 
this reading, “[I]t is a mistake to think that there is anything 
informative about nonsense. Nonsense is nonsense and to think of the 
Tractatus as showing some ‘essential feature of reality, which reality 
has all right, but which we cannot say or think it has,’ is to make 
Wittgenstein ‘chicken out.’”110 The purpose of the Tractatus is 
therefore therapeutic, rather than demonstrative.111 It seeks to cure us 
 
 106. Hacker, supra note 104, at 353 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (citing 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.522, at 187); see also G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 162 (4th ed. 1971) (drawing this same 
conclusion); Roy Brand, Making Sense Speaking Nonsense, 35 PHIL. F. 311, 313 (2004) (same). 
The ineffable reading appears to be a matter of precedent in the Second Circuit. See Bery v. 
City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ideas and concepts embodied in visual 
art have the power to transcend . . . language limitations and reach beyond a particular language 
group to both the educated and the illiterate.”). 
 107. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 6.54, at 189 (“My propositions are elucidatory in 
this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out 
through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.)”).  
 108. See generally, e.g., James Conant, Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early 
Wittgenstein, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 104, at 174 [hereinafter Conant, 
Elucidation and Nonsense]; James Conant, Must We Show What We Cannot Say?, in THE 
SENSES OF STANLEY CAVELL 242 (Richard Fleming & Michael Payne eds., 1989); James 
Conant, Two Conceptions of Die Überwindung der Metaphysik: Carnap and Early Wittgenstein, 
in WITTGENSTEIN IN AMERICA 13 (Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd eds., 2001); CORA 
DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder: How To Read the Tractatus, reprinted in THE 
REALISTIC SPIRIT: WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE MIND 179 (1991) [hereinafter 
DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder]; Cora Diamond, Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, 55 PHIL. Q. 78 (2005). 
 109. Edmund Dain, Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 25 S. AFR. J. 
PHIL. 91, 92 (2006) (“[T]here are, for austerity, no logically distinct kinds of nonsense; all 
nonsense, logically speaking, is on a par.”). 
 110. Brand, supra note 106, at 332 (quoting DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder, supra 
note 108, at 181). It was Diamond who first wrote that the ineffable interpretation of 
Wittgenstein read the philosopher as “chickening out.” DIAMOND, Throwing Away the Ladder, 
supra note 108, at 181. 
 111. Marie McGinn, Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, 49 PHIL. Q. 491, 491–92 (1999); see also Brand, supra note 106, at 326 (“The say/show 
distinction is meant to liberate us from the mental torture of a mind obsessively occupied with 
itself, chasing after itself in a movement that is increasingly vacuous, isolated, and cold.”); 
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of the pointless and potentially harmful effort of trying to find 
meaning in nonsense.112 On this reading, “the whole talk of the limits 
of language is confused; there is nothing that language cannot say. 
Language can represent every possible fact in the world and there are 
no other-worldly facts.”113 After all, Wittgenstein himself said that 
“[t]he limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”114 And 
although Russell’s introduction to the book seems to support the 
ineffability reading, Wittgenstein thought that Russell had not “got 
hold of my main contention.”115 
In an effort to avoid joining a debate it wishes merely to 
describe, this brief description of the ineffable and resolute readings 
inevitably simplifies and flattens them. Subtleties abound; variations 
are common.116 The goal here is simply to suggest that on either view 
nonsense can be cognitively illuminating—meaningless speech, in 
other words, can have value as a means to truth. For adherents of the 
ineffable view, nonsense can demonstrate the existence of important 
 
Moore & Sullivan, supra note 69, at 179 (“There is nothing ineffable. There is only the 
temptation to see sense where it is lacking. Wittgenstein’s aim is therapeutic.”). 
 112. See Conant, Elucidation and Nonsense, supra note 108, at 196 (“[T]he aim for the 
Tractarian elucidation is to reveal (through the employment of mere nonsense) that what 
appears to be substantial nonsense is mere nonsense.”); see also Cheung, supra note 13, at 200 
(concluding that, according to Diamond and Conant, “the Tractatus is not trying to help anyone 
see any unsayable insights,” but that “the aim of the Tractatus is merely to liberate nonsense 
utterers from nonsense, and that this is to be achieved by the non-frame sentences serving as 
elucidations”).  
 113. Brand, supra note 106, at 330.  
 114. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 5.6, at 149 (emphasis omitted).  
 115. As Wittgenstein wrote to Russell: 
I’m afraid you haven’t really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole 
business of logical prop[osition]s is only a corollary. The main point is the theory of 
what can be expressed [gesagt] by prop[osition]s—i.e. by language—(and, which 
comes to the same, what can be thought) and what can not be expressed by 
prop[osition]s, but only shown [gezeigt]; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of 
philosophy. 
Letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell (Aug. 19, 1919), in LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN: LETTERS TO RUSSELL, KEYNES AND MOORE 71, 71 (G.H. von Wright ed., 
1974) (alterations in original). 
 116. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 106, at 312, 330 (defending an “existential-performative” 
reading of Wittgenstein, which would hold that “[t]here is a showing that is not a saying but 
what is shown is nothing beyond language; rather it is the very existence of language—its ability 
to perform sense”); Cheung, supra note 13, at 199 n.13 (noting that “[t]he resolute reading 
allows numerous variants,” which have been classified “into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions based 
on their different views on the nature of the frame”). 
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but perhaps unsayable truths. A great deal of art might do just that.117 
And for adherents of the resolute view, nonsense can be a tool to save 
us from useless and potentially misleading efforts to establish 
meaning when none can be found. It is therapeutic—intellectually 
and not just emotionally so. 
But high-level epistemological debates are not the only contexts 
in which nonsense can contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Much 
as falsehood can demonstrate truth,118 nonsense can illuminate 
meaning by demonstrating its boundaries. The Tractatus is not unique 
in that regard. It has been said that Carroll created his nonsense verse 
“not to put anything in doubt or to entertain any new conceptual 
possibilities, but . . . to remind us where sense is to be found.”119 So, 
too, can engaging with nonsense enable individuals to better 
comprehend truth and meaning. This is certainly the case with regard 
to art, which as discussed above is often overtly nonsensical. Art can, 
as the Supreme Court has recognized, “affect public attitudes and 
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a 
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which 
characterizes all artistic expression,”120 even when it lacks meaning. 
As William Charlton puts it, “[W]hereas we outgrow play with spoons 
and handkerchiefs, our intellectual faculties will always benefit from 
the quickening effect of good nonsense.”121 
 
 117. Hegel, for one, believed that art was useful—albeit not as much as philosophy—as a 
guide to truth. See Nahmod, supra note 91, at 232 (citing 1 G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
FINE ART 15–16 (F.P.B. Osmaston trans., 1920)). 
 118. See N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (“Even a false statement 
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’” 
(quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 1, 20 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989))); MILL, supra, at 20 (concluding that silencing speech 
“rob[s] the human race” because even when an opinion is false, its contrast with the truth will 
more clearly illuminate the latter); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of 
Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 1203, 1203 (2008) (“False statements often have 
value in themselves, and we should protect them even in some situations where we are not 
concerned with chilling truthful speech. . . . False speech, therefore, is valuable because it is an 
essential part of a larger system that works to increase society’s knowledge.”). 
 119. Tilghman, supra note 24, at 262.  
 120. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to motion 
pictures); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77 (1996) (“Art can 
carry ideas and information, but it also goes beyond logical, rational and discursive 
communication. It provides a risk-free opportunity to live in other worlds, enlarging individual 
perspective and strengthening individual judgment.”). 
 121. Charlton, supra note 4, at 360.  
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2. Autonomy.  The most potentially expansive theory of the First 
Amendment is that speech deserves constitutional protection because 
and to the degree that it furthers individual autonomy.122 Professor 
Martin Redish, perhaps the most prominent defender of this view, has 
argued that “all forms of expression that further the self-realization 
value, which justifies the democratic system as well as free speech’s 
role in it, are deserving of full constitutional protection.”123 Professor 
Ed Baker similarly argued that speech “should receive constitutional 
protection . . . because and to the extent that it is a manifestation of 
individual autonomy.”124 The expansiveness of the autonomy 
conception leaves its defenders with a vast territory to patrol, because 
nearly any act can be described as a manifestation of individual 
autonomy. 
The very breadth of the autonomy view comfortably 
encompasses many forms of meaningless speech, for nonsense can 
surely manifest autonomy whether or not it “develop[s] the rational 
faculties.”125 After all, much of what we think and feel is impossible to 
express in words.126 This may be a result of deficiencies in our shared 
language, our limited individual vocabularies, or “practical, social, or 
psychological impediments to our using even the linguistic resources 
available to us.”127 Whatever the reason for these limits, or whether 
 
 122. There are potentially important distinctions within what I have called the autonomy 
view—some scholars trumpet the values of self-realization or self-fulfillment instead. For 
simplicity’s sake, I have grouped them together here.  
 123. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982) 
(footnote omitted). Tom Scanlon once defended a similar viewpoint, see generally, e.g., Thomas 
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972) [hereinafter 
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression], but has since done his best to repudiate it, see 
T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. REV. 541, 
546 (2011) (“As someone who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy as the centerpiece of 
a theory of freedom of expression, my position in the Dantean Inferno of free speech debates 
seems to be repeatedly assailed with misuses of this notion, no matter how I criticize them.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 124. C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997); 
see also C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 6–7 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s self-realization). 
 125. Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 80 (1989) (“[E]xpression may promote 
human flourishing in ways other than developing the rational faculties. Freedom of speech may 
allow the expression of powerful emotions and provide an outlet for the creative impulse in a 
variety of forms, including literature, drama, and the visual arts.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Moore & Sullivan, supra note 69, at 173 (“Most of us have at one time or 
another found that we cannot express how we feel about something.”). 
 127. Id. 
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we recognize when they are transgressed, our efforts to express what 
lies beyond them create a kind of nonsense—statements that are 
unverifiable, fail to describe any possible state of affairs, or attempt to 
say what can only be shown.128 
And yet from the perspective of individual autonomy and self-
fulfillment, we may have very good reason not to pass over such 
things in silence. Though arguably nonsensical, beyond those limits 
may lie our chaotic, contradictory, and even “ineffable” selves.129 
Efforts to represent them may lack meaning according to some 
definitions, but they are also a very important part of individual and 
social human development.130 Even Wittgenstein recognized that 
there was a kind of mystical value in some kinds of nonsense.131 
As a First Amendment matter, these issues—and the autonomy 
value of nonsense—are most salient with regard to artistic speech, the 
constitutional status of which has been a perennial problem for the 
First Amendment.132 Some courts and scholars simply take it for 
granted that the Amendment must cover art, and do little to explain 
why.133 Perhaps equally common are efforts to suggest that art does in 
fact have constitutionally salient meaning. As Professor Marci 
Hamilton notes, “Mirroring the commentators’ approach, the Court 
tends to protect art only to the extent that it is a vehicle for ideas, 
 
 128. For a description of the representational approach, under which these would be 
considered nonsensical, see infra Part II.A. 
 129. Cf. ROSEN, supra note 62, at 13 (“By the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal, in the ‘Chandos Letter,’ asserted the inadequacy of language to 
express anything profoundly individual and subjective, one of the first words to have completely 
lost its meaning for him was ‘freedom.’”). 
 130. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 79 (“Self-preservation cannot be achieved merely by 
following principles; it depends on the realization of human potentials, and these can only be 
brought to light by literature, not by systematic discourse.” (quoting WOLFGANG ISER, THE 
ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE 76 (1978))). 
 131. See generally JAMES R. ATKINSON, THE MYSTICAL IN WITTGENSTEIN’S EARLY 
WRITINGS (2009). 
 132. See Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3 (2007) (“The 
Supreme Court has ruled that particular instances of art speech are protected expression, but 
has not supplied a satisfactory rationale for protecting art. . . . Major First Amendment theorists 
likewise have not devoted substantial attention to art speech.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within . . . First Amendment 
protection.”); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“A rule 
cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas.”); Tushnet, supra note 
9, at 170 n.4 (“Much of the secondary literature on art and the First Amendment assumes art’s 
coverage and derives First Amendment rules to deal with specific problems . . . .”). 
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especially political ideas.”134 For many works of art, this approach is 
perfectly adequate,135 particularly given the extremely expansive 
definitions of “meaning” that courts and scholars apply to art.136 But 
not all art can fit into the meaning-dependent model, no matter how 
far the concept of meaning is stretched, which raises what Hamilton 
describes as “the difficulty of explaining how a first amendment 
theory valuing speech for its rationally comprehensible ideas can 
comfortably accommodate the phenomenon of art.”137 
Perhaps instead we should take seriously the notion that some 
art is nonsensical.138 Indeed, if works of art contained articulable 
ideas, one suspects that they would be said and not sung.139 Tushnet 
puts the point powerfully, and with apt illustrations: 
To begin, many modern sculptors would deny that they “intend” to 
express anything in their work. Rather, they seek to explore the 
relation between shape and space, nothing more (or less). Nor . . . is 
the abjuration of any intent to express limited to sculptors. . . . Art as 
form—being rather than meaning—is not intended to communicate, 
even though it may sometimes do so. A related point is that 
sometimes artworks are engagements with a tradition. As such, it is 
not clear that they “mean” anything.140 
 
 134. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 105. 
 135. See id. at 108 (“Because a significant number of artworks can be construed to have 
discursive content, existing theories of art’s first amendment content undeniably provide 
protection to a degree.”); see also Fromer, supra note 100, at 1478 n.253 (“[T]he more 
meaningful something is, the better people like it. At least for artistically naïve observers, 
meaning is by far the most important determinant of preference.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting COLIN MARTINDALE, THE CLOCKWORK MUSE: THE PREDICTABILITY OF ARTISTIC 
CHANGE 42–43 (1990))). 
 136. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (1996) (“[P]aintings, photographs, 
prints and sculptures . . . always communicate some idea or concept to those who view [them], 
and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); Eberle, supra note 132, at 7 
(“[A]rt speech is the autonomous use of the artist’s creative process to make and fashion form, 
color, symbol, image, movement or other communication of meaning that is made manifest in a 
tangible medium.”). 
 137. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 104. 
 138. See generally, e.g., HERBERT READ, ICON AND IDEA (1955) (arguing that art is not 
always the product of cognitive activity and that the icon sometimes precedes the idea). 
 139. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 74 (quoting Isadora Duncan as saying, “If I could say 
it, I wouldn’t have to dance it.”); see also JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 74 (1934) (“If all 
meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not 
exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only by immediately visible and 
audible qualities, and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put into 
words is to deny their distinctive existence.”). 
 140. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 188–89 (footnotes omitted). 
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Rather than trying to impute meaning to such artistic speech, we 
could instead ask whether nonsense for nonsense’s sake—like art for 
art’s sake141—serves important First Amendment values. 
Among those values, autonomy is the most natural candidate. 
Surely one of the fundamental goals of artistic expression, after all, is 
to try to say or represent the inexpressible.142 To do so is to speak 
nonsense, and yet no one could doubt the importance of such 
nonsense to the autonomy and self-development of those speaking 
it.143 It can serve the autonomy interests of viewers as well. Aesthetic 
judgments are part of the “pleasure of freedom itself,” and are in that 
way “disinterested and ruleless, unconstrained by . . . appetite” or “a 
master concept to which they must conform.”144 Art is therefore 
sometimes important for individual autonomy precisely because its 
lack of meaning removes it from the realm of knowledge.145 
This is not to say that the autonomy principle provides an 
unmitigated case for protecting nonsense. Misleading covert 
nonsense, for example, can further the autonomy of the person 
speaking it while simultaneously interfering with the autonomy of 
those tricked by it.146 Moreover, if autonomy is intertwined with 
rational cognition, covert nonsense might be a threat to autonomy 
instead of a means to advance it. Many leading proponents of the 
 
 141. See Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding 
that the First Amendment protects “purely artistic” expression—“art for art’s sake”). 
 142. Cf. Adler, supra note 10, at 1366 (quoting postmodern painter David Salle as saying 
that his paintings are about “all the paintings I won’t make or can’t make”). 
 143. Leo Tolstoy—whom Wittgenstein “admired and read constantly,” Brand, supra note 
106, at 311—suggested that creating nonsense was perhaps the only thing that humans could do 
that their own creator could not. See id. (“God can do everything, it is true, but there is one 
thing he cannot do, and that is speak nonsense.” (quoting LEO TOLSTOY, THE GOSPEL 
ACCORDING TO TOLSTOY 11 (David Patterson ed. & trans., 1992))). 
 144. Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311, 324 (1999).  
 145. See id. (“Judgments of beauty are thus free in a twofold sense. They are neither driven 
by desire nor determined by a rule.”); see also Charlton, supra note 4, at 356–59 (evaluating 
nonsense in terms of Kant’s three types of aesthetic effect—the beautiful, the sublime, and the 
funny—and concluding that the first provides the best “clue”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (“[B]eauty has constitutional 
status too, and . . . the life of the imagination is as important to the human adult as the life of the 
intellect.”); Nahmod, supra note 91, at 231 (“Because art is removed from knowledge and 
desire, it follows for Kant that art and the beautiful cannot express ideas or take positions.”). 
 146. Cf. Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for 
Fraudulent Inducement of Contract?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 456 (2009) (“Neo-Kantians tend to 
agree that lying is an affront to autonomy. Lies interfere with the victim’s rational deliberation 
and rob the victim of her prospects for making at least some sensible choices about a course of 
action or belief.”). 
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autonomy approach seem to hold this view. Redish, for example, 
refers to “the instrumental value in developing individuals’ mental 
faculties so that they may reach their full intellectual potential.”147 
Professor Fred Schauer has similarly described the self-realization 
view of the Amendment as being based on the human potential for 
“personal growth, self-fulfillment, and development of the rational 
faculties.”148 If these views are correct, then autonomy is limited by 
rationality, and nonsense might lack constitutional salience precisely 
because it is not subject to analysis on the basis of its rationality. 
3. Democracy.  The final major First Amendment value is 
democracy. As with the autonomy and marketplace approaches, 
democratic theories of the First Amendment come in many forms. 
Perhaps most famously, Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the 
Amendment categorically protects political speech (and only political 
speech) against government interference.149 Robert Bork took a 
similar, albeit narrower, view.150 More recently, Post has argued that 
the primary value animating the First Amendment is that of 
“democratic legitimation”: the notion that “First Amendment 
coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively necessary 
for influencing public opinion.”151 
Because democratic approaches to the First Amendment seem to 
be based on the content of speech acts,152 it might not be immediately 
 
 147. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 (1984) 
(emphasis added). In his original defense of the autonomy position, Scanlon argued that, on a 
Millian approach, “the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize while 
still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.” Scanlon, A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression, supra note 123, at 215.  
 148. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 49 (1982). 
 149. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 94 (1948) (“The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to 
all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with 
which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of public interest.”). 
 150. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 29 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment protects only “criticisms of public officials and 
policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and 
speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”).  
 151. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 18; see also James Weinstein, Participatory 
Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491 
(2011) (defending “the view that contemporary American free speech doctrine is best explained 
as assuring the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern 
ourselves”). 
 152. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 149, at 26–27 (“[T]he vital point, as stated 
negatively, is that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of 
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apparent how nonsense—which lacks cognitive content of any kind—
can be entitled to protection. After all, nonsense does not directly 
convey information about voting. And yet totalitarian states often 
ban nonrepresentational and nonsensical art.153 Sheldon Nahmod 
points to the Soviet Union, whose leaders believed that “art should 
serve only to reinforce socialist ideals and thereby inculcate 
appropriate behavior; nonrepresentational art [was] considered 
decadent, bourgeois and dangerous.”154 Whether or not that fear is 
well-founded, it certainly is not unique to the former Soviet Union, 
nor even to totalitarian states. As Hamilton notes, “Conventional 
readings of Plato, for example, indicate that he believed that art 
should be censored because it threatens order and stability.”155 
But these odd outliers are surely just that, and their pathologies 
are not necessarily the ones with which First Amendment doctrine 
need be concerned. Moreover, this only explains why some states 
might seek to suppress nonsense, not why democracies should protect 
it. What positive democratic value does overt nonsense serve? 
Perhaps, like art, nonsense can help cultivate the kind of citizen on 
whom a well-functioning democracy depends. Meiklejohn, for 
example, argued that “[l]iterature and the arts must be protected by 
the First Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive and 
informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the 
riches of the general welfare are created.”156 This may be a bit of a 
stretch even on its own terms, but it does suggest a possible 
connection between nonsense and democracy. Just as engaging with 
nonsense can help people perceive cognitive truths in the 
 
the issue rather than another.”). Because he focuses on media of communication, this is not 
necessarily true of Post’s approach, though elsewhere I have questioned whether his theory can 
really avoid an inquiry into speech’s content. See Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert 
Knowledge, and the Press, 87 U. WASH. L. REV. 409, 417–23 (2012). 
 153. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 98–100 (discussing examples from post–Cultural 
Revolution China, communist Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, and elsewhere); see also Eberle, 
supra note 132, at 12–13 (discussing examples from Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the 
Modernist Movement); cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is 
one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the 
totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and 
to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state.”). 
 154. Nahmod, supra note 91, at 225; see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 172 (noting “Nazi 
Germany’s suppression of ‘degenerate’ art and Soviet Russia’s promotion of socialist realist art 
at the expense of abstraction”).  
 155. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 76.  
 156. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 257.  
BLOCHER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:10 PM 
2014] NONSENSE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1455 
marketplace for ideas,157 perhaps it can also inform their 
understanding and appreciation of what Brandeis referred to as 
“political truth.”158 
A second possibility is that overt nonsense serves as a kind of 
“safety-valve”—a way to release what might otherwise become 
dangerous dissent.159 On this reading, speech “is an essential 
mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and 
change.”160 The Merry Pranksters, whose escapades in their brightly 
decorated bus were catalogued in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test,161 
often “tootl[ed] the multitudes,” which referred “to the way a 
Prankster would stand with a flute on the bus’s roof and play sounds 
to imitate people’s various reactions to the bus.”162 Such activity 
probably did not convey any particularized message or “idea.” But 
without that outlet, perhaps the Pranksters’ basically nonsensical 
hijinks would have devolved into something more destructive. 
A related argument for extending constitutional protection to 
nonsense draws on institutional considerations that are especially 
salient for, but not unique to, democracy conceptions of the First 
Amendment: that the Amendment must protect nonsense to fully 
insulate valuable and meaningful speech. The Supreme Court has 
long recognized that “First Amendment freedoms need breathing 
space to survive.”163 This proposition is based on the belief that speech 
is “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our 
society. The threat of sanctions may deter [its] exercise almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions.”164 Doctrine has been 
significantly shaped by that belief, perhaps most prominently in the 
context of First Amendment standing doctrine, which permits people 
to attack on free speech grounds a law that would concededly be 
 
 157. See supra 118–121 and accompanying text. 
 158. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 159. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially 
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2008) (describing safety-valve theory).  
 160. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). 
 161. TOM WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (1968). 
 162. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Ken Kesey, Author of ‘Cuckoo’s Nest,’ Who Defined the 
Psychedelic Era, Dies at 66, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, A47; see WOLFE, supra note 161, at 100 
(“Tootling the Multitudes”). 
 163. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 164. Id. 
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constitutional as applied to them,165 so long as the law reaches a 
substantial amount of protected speech.166 
The nothingness of nonsense might be exactly the kind of 
breathing space that sense needs to thrive. After all, the Court has 
recognized that, if only truthful speech were protected, people would 
“tend to make only statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone.’”167 Perhaps if only meaningful speech were protected, people 
would shy away from pushing the boundaries of logic and language 
for fear of speaking unprotected nonsense. As the Court reasoned in 
Cohen v. California,168 “[F]orbid[ding] particular words . . . also run[s] 
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”169 Nonsense 
might merit protection precisely because of its instrumental value in 
protecting meaningful speech. 
II.  THE MEANING OF MEANING FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The discussion up until this point has described an important but 
underexplored category of speech—nonsense—and made a 
preliminary case for its constitutional protection. In the process, it has 
flanked another target: the very concept of meaning itself. This is 
dangerous quarry, particularly when wounded by the apparent threat 
to its claim on the First Amendment’s territory. With due concern for 
the hazards, though, it is difficult to imagine a better way to consider 
meaning than by, as the preceding discussion has, exploring its 
absence. The goal of this Part is to use that analysis to confront the 
meaning of “meaning” for First Amendment purposes. 
It would be easier, perhaps, to avoid the issue by simply saying 
that meaning does not matter for the First Amendment. But a wide 
range of doctrine and scholarship suggests that the easy road is 
foreclosed, and that meaning—generally equated with ideas, 
viewpoints, or content—is a necessary ingredient of constitutionally 
salient speech. As Professor John Greenman notes, “Frequently, 
behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys 
 
 165. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
 166. Id. at 615. 
 167. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 168. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 169. Id. at 26. 
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‘ideas’ or ‘information.’”170 This meaning-dependent approach is 
embedded in constitutional doctrine in various ways, and has been 
buttressed by thoughtful scholarship. Peter Tiersma, for example, 
proposes that “the first requirement for communication by conduct is 
that the conduct be meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. 
This is simply an extension of a basic principle of language: a speaker 
normally cannot use sounds to communicate unless the sounds have 
some meaning attached to them.”171 Likewise, Melville Nimmer’s 
influential account of symbolic speech holds that “symbolic speech 
requires not merely that given conduct results in a meaning effect, but 
that the actor causing such conduct must intend such a meaning effect 
by his conduct.”172 
But the meaning-dependent approach also raises difficult 
problems, for the reasons suggested in Part I: nonsense is pervasive, 
and much of it has a strong relationship to the First Amendment’s 
core values. Moreover, despite their apparent insistence on the 
importance of meaning, courts and scholars have done very little to 
establish what meaning means.173 That imprecision, in turn, provides 
space to craft a doctrinal and theoretical apparatus that allows 
meaning to play a central role in First Amendment discourse without 
completely denying constitutional coverage to nonsense. This is no 
easy task, however, for the necessary tools are scarce and scattered 
throughout the First Amendment’s messy workshop. 
 
 170. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347; see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: 
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the 
Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (“Under nearly every theory of free 
speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to 
inform people through the content of one’s message.” (emphasis added)). 
 171. Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1559. Tiersma creates a two-part test for determining whether 
nonverbal communication falls within the freedom of speech: “First, action must have meaning, 
either by way of convention or in some other manner. Second, the actor must intend to 
communicate by means of the action.” Id. at 1526; see also id. at 1561 (“An intent to 
communicate obviously requires an intent to convey information.”). 
 172. Nimmer, supra note 3, at 37. Nimmer also explains that “[t]he meaning effect is a signal 
that registers in the mind of at least one observer. The nonmeaning effect is not dependent upon 
the reaction of other minds.” Id. at 36. As noted above, despite its reliance on meaning, Nimmer 
considered his approach broad enough to reach artistic speech lacking verbal and cognitive 
content. See id .at 35.  
 173. Cf. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1338–39 (“Everybody knows that communication is 
important, but nobody knows how to define it. The best scholars refer to it. Free-speech law 
protects it. Smart people tell us that the Internet should be structured to promote it. But no 
one—no scholar or judge—has successfully captured it. Few have even tried.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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Fortunately, craftsmen in adjacent workshops can provide useful 
guidance. The relationship between meaning and language has been 
the central obsession of analytic philosophy for the better part of a 
century. Of course, analytic philosophers are primarily concerned 
with determining what can meaningfully be said, not what kinds of 
speech are or should be protected from government sanction. But 
with regard to the specific issue of meaning, their hard-won advances 
are directly relevant to the questions that constitutional law has set 
for itself. Moreover, as the following discussion shows, echoes of their 
efforts can already be heard in First Amendment discourse. 
Two major schools of thought have emerged, which, with 
regrettably necessary simplification, can be called the 
“representational” and “use” approaches to meaning. The former, 
associated with Wittgenstein in his early writings, Bertrand Russell, 
and logical positivism, finds meaning in the connection between 
language and extralinguistic concepts.174 Language that fails to 
represent such concepts is nonsensical. Some First Amendment 
discourse implicitly utilizes such an approach. The authorities cited 
above, for example, generally employ a more-or-less representational 
approach to meaning by searching for “ideas”175 or “content.”176 The 
frequent scholarly explorations of nonrepresentational art also seem 
motivated by a representational approach, for nonrepresentation is 
only relevant to the degree that representationalism itself is 
constitutionally salient. 
The lessons of analytic philosophy suggest that these are the 
wrong questions to ask. As Paul Chevigny explains: 
Having abandoned the view of language as a “copy” of the “real 
world,” a set of names for objects, and assertions that have meaning 
only to the extent that they faithfully represent reality, philosophers 
increasingly think of language as a system of discourse in which 
assertions can have “meaning” and be “true” not as representations 
 
 174. “Representational” is used here as a rough and imperfect label for many related 
schools of thought, from foundationalism to logical positivism. Paying the inevitable costs of 
oversimplification nevertheless seems worthwhile, since my purpose here is not to illuminate 
anything specific to those philosophies, but simply to show how, generally speaking, they might 
inform the First Amendment. 
 175. See, e.g., Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347 (surveying various First Amendment 
arguments, including one that holds “that communication is the conveyance of ‘ideas’”). 
 176. See Volokh, supra note 170, at 1304 (“Under nearly every theory of free speech, the 
right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to inform people 
through the content of one’s message.”). 
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of “reality” but as ideas for which good reasons can be found in 
other parts of the system of discourse.177 
That is, if meaning is relevant for First Amendment purposes, it must 
be found in the way language is used, not in what it represents. The 
following discussion attempts to show what that entails as a 
constitutional matter and why it represents an improvement over the 
representational approach. And yet bringing use meaning to the 
forefront of First Amendment doctrine drags with it a new set of 
problems, including the inherent difficulty of identifying the language 
games that imbue speech with meaning. 
The goal of this Part is to suggest how First Amendment 
discourse and doctrine can fruitfully utilize the concept of meaning, 
not to fully define speech, say anything new about analytic 
philosophy, or—perish the thought—provide an original or 
comprehensive reading of Wittgenstein.178 The following accounts of 
analytic philosophy will be familiar, if simplified, to philosophers; the 
First Amendment theory and doctrine will be familiar to legal 
scholars. Indeed, this is far from the first article to suggest 
connections between them. But its angle of approach—through the 
region of nonsense—is novel for First Amendment scholarship, and it 
aims to provide a fresh and useful, if complicated and imperfect, way 
to think about meaning for First Amendment purposes. 
A. Representational Meaning 
In 1899, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote: “We must think 
things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words 
into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and 
the true.”179 For a man whose contribution to American jurisprudence 
 
 177. Chevigny, supra note 95, at 162 (footnote omitted). 
 178. Wittgenstein’s influence is so magnetic that the very act of citing him has become a 
language game of its own. See Steven L. Winter, For What It’s Worth, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
789, 796–97 (1992) (noting the signaling value of citations to Wittgenstein “[i]n some legal 
academic circles”); see also Dennis W. Arrow, “Rich,” “Textured,” and “Nuanced”: 
Constitutional “Scholarship” and Constitutional Messianism at the Millenium, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
149, 149 n.* (1999) (positing the same phenomenon with regard to law review editors). 
 179. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 
(1899); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 9, 1925), in 1 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. 
LASKI, 1916–1935, at 737, 738 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (noting how difficult it is to 
“think accurately—and think things not words”). 
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can largely be measured by his mastery of language,180 this might 
come as something of a surprise. The remark suggests that the 
meaning of words lies in “the facts for which they stand.” In that way, 
it is emblematic of the representational approach to meaning—one 
that locates meaning in the relationship between language and 
extralinguistic concepts.181 Words that do not denote such concepts 
are nonsensical and, if the doctrinal descriptions set out above are 
accurate, fall outside the boundaries of the First Amendment. But as 
the remainder of this Section shows, such a representational approach 
has serious defects as a guide for constitutional law. 
Holmes is often classified as a pragmatist,182 and though his circle 
of scientifically and philosophically inclined friends was broad and 
deep,183 it apparently did not include those in Vienna and Cambridge 
who were concurrently exploring the relationship between “things” 
and “words.” Even as Holmes was penning his monumentally 
influential free speech opinions, and essentially giving the First 
Amendment its first normative theory,184 those thinkers—Russell and 
Wittgenstein prominent but not alone among them—were probing 
the meaning of meaning itself.185 
In the early 1900s, Russell was perhaps the world’s preeminent 
logician and mathematician. His Principia Mathematica was published 
in the 1910s, just as Holmes was laying the normative foundations of 
 
 180. See Richard A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM 
THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR. xvii (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). 
 181. This does not mean, of course, that each word has only one thing to which it is 
connected. As Holmes noted elsewhere, “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it 
is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
Conversely, the same “thing” may be connected to multiple words, as in Gottlob Frege’s famous 
example of the “Morning Star” and “Evening Star,” both of which refer to Venus. 
 182. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788 (1989) 
(“Holmes as legal pragmatist is hardly a new idea. His associations with Charles Sanders Peirce 
and William James, as well as his admiration for John Dewey, have led a number of intellectual 
historians to count him as an adherent and even a founder of the pragmatist movement.”). 
 183. See generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001) (describing the social 
and intellectual “club” that included such luminaries as Holmes, William James, and Charles 
Peirce). 
 184. See Post, supra note 85, at 2356. 
 185. Starting with Russell and Cambridge means omitting any number of important 
thinkers, including Gottlob Frege and the Austrian logical positivists, who arguably deserve 
credit for the very creation of analytic philosophy. However costly, such omissions are necessary 
for the sake of brevity and clarity. Fuller accounts can be found in THE LINGUISTIC TURN: 
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Richard M. Rorty ed., 1992). 
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the First Amendment. As part of his wide-ranging intellectual 
explorations, Russell contemplated what it means for a statement to 
have meaning. He eventually came to believe that statements are 
meaningful, even if not verifiable, so long as they express a possible 
state of affairs: “[A] sentence ‘p’ is significant if ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I 
doubt that p’ or etc., can describe a perceived fact . . . .”186 Thus a 
statement like “The King of France is bald” can be meaningful 
because it denotes a concept, even though the thing it denotes (the 
King of France) does not exist.187 Statements that fail to denote are 
nonsensical. Russell’s famous example of such nonsense was the 
statement “[Q]uadruplicity drinks procrastination.”188 
At around the same time as he was developing this approach to 
meaning, Russell took on a new pupil, whom he at first referred to as 
“[m]y ferocious German . . . armour-plated against all assaults of 
reasoning.”189 Within one academic term, Russell learned that his 
German was Austrian and quite capable of his own assaultive 
reasoning. Russell was intellectually smitten: “I love him & feel he 
will solve the problems I am too old to solve.”190 The ferocious 
Austrian was, of course, Wittgenstein. For him, as Professor Dennis 
Patterson says, “all philosophical problems [were] ultimately 
problems of language.”191 Although the focus on problems of 
language was consistent throughout Wittgenstein’s career, his 
approach to them can be divided into two basically distinct phases, 
only the first of which fits the representational mold described here. 
For the “early” Wittgenstein, author of the spectacularly 
impenetrable Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, sense consisted in “a 
determinate relation between a proposition and an independent state 
of affairs.”192  
 
 186. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH 181 (1940). 
 187. See generally Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479 (1905) (propounding a 
“theory of denoting” that holds that “denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, 
but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning”).  
 188. RUSSELL, supra note 186, at 166. 
 189. RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 40 (1990). 
 190. Id. at 41. 
 191. Patterson, supra note 1, at 938. 
 192. Brand, supra note 106, at 314; see also Kavka, supra note 83, at 1457 (concluding that 
the Tractatus is based on the belief that “the function of language is to model or picture the 
world”). 
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To explore their “relation,” Wittgenstein focused on the 
relationship between thought and expression. As the preface or 
“frame” of the Tractatus explained: 
  The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not 
to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a 
limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this 
limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be 
thought). 
  The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies 
on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.193 
That limit represents the boundary of both meaning and of reality. As 
Wittgenstein explained in the koan-like propositions of the book 
itself: “The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a 
model of the reality as we think it is.”194 Anything that is not a 
proposition is, strictly speaking, nonsense, for anything that is not a 
proposition fails to present a picture of reality: “Only the proposition 
has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.”195 
It follows that there is no way to comprehend or create reality but 
through language, and thus “[t]he limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world.”196 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that all concepts are 
reducible to language.197 Wittgenstein was obsessed with the notion 
that some things “can not be expressed by prop[osition]s, but only 
shown . . . ; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.”198 
As Elizabeth Anscombe, a distinguished philosopher and former 
student of Wittgenstein’s, later explained: 
[A]n important part is played in the Tractatus by the things which, 
though they cannot be ‘said’, are yet ‘shewn’ or ‘displayed’. That is 
to say: it would be right to call them ‘true’ if, per impossible, they 
 
 193. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 27.  
 194. Id. § 4.01, at 63. 
 195. Id. § 3.3, at 51. 
 196. Id. § 5.6, at 149 (emphasis omitted); see id. § 3.032, at 43, 45 (“To present in language 
anything which ‘contradicts logic’ is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a 
figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not 
exist.”). 
 197. For a description of the debate between “ineffable” and “resolute” readings of 
Wittgenstein, see supra notes 103–17 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell, supra note 115, at 71 (first 
alteration in original). 
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could be said; in fact they cannot be called true, since they cannot be 
said, but ‘can be shewn’, or ‘are exhibited’, in the propositions saying 
the various things that can be said.199 
Whatever their importance, attempts to say these things inevitably 
result in nonsense. Holmes seemed to have something similar in mind 
when he suggested the difference between thinking things and 
thinking words.200 
Though Wittgenstein himself would apparently later abandon 
it,201 the effort to find meaning in the relationship between words and 
things certainly did not end with the Tractatus. The influence of the 
representational approach is palpable in the work of A.J. Ayer, the 
great English logical positivist, whose Language, Truth, and Logic 
defends among other things the “verification principle.”202 That 
principle holds that statements are nonsensical when they are not 
analytically or empirically verifiable.203 A similar focus on verifiability 
seems to underlie popular intuitions about the relationship between 
meaning and truth. For example, Wikipedia’s rules provide that “[a]ll 
material in Wikipedia mainspace, including everything in articles, lists 
and captions, must be verifiable.”204 
The influence of the representational approach extends, albeit 
uncredited, to First Amendment doctrine itself. This is perhaps most 
apparent in what John Greenman calls the Supreme Court’s 
“ideaism”—the principle that “behavior is . . . covered by the First 
Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ or ‘information.’”205 The notion that 
ideas—cognitive meanings—are the focus of the First Amendment is 
 
 199. ANSCOMBE, supra note 106, at 162. 
 200. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 201. See infra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 202. ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 31 (Dover Publ’ns 1952) 
(1936). 
 203. See id. at 41 (“[E]very empirical hypothesis must be relevant to some actual, or 
possible, experience, so that a statement which is not relevant to any experience is not an 
empirical hypothesis, and accordingly has no factual content. . . . [T]his is precisely what the 
principle of verifiability asserts.”); Chevigny, supra note 95, at 163 (“If a proposition was not 
true or false by definition or did not give rise to an empirical prediction that could, in principle, 
be verified, the proposition was meaningless.”). 
 204. Wikipedia:Verifiability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Verifiability (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). Robert Post quotes an earlier version of the rule: “[T]he 
threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—that is, whether readers are able 
to check that material added to Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source, not 
whether we think it is true.” POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 8 (emphasis omitted). 
 205. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347–48. 
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so often repeated that it might sometimes pass unnoticed. In New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,206 the Supreme Court explained that the 
Amendment’s “constitutional safeguard . . . ‘was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.’”207 Since then, the Court has 
often invoked the principle that “[t]he First 
Amendment . . . embodies ‘[o]ur profound national commitment to 
the free exchange of ideas.’”208 In Miller v. California,209 for example, 
the Court seemed to suggest that ideas are so important that the 
existence of one is sufficient for constitutional coverage: “All ideas 
having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox 
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate 
of opinion—have the full protection of the [First Amendment’s] 
guaranties . . . .”210 By the same logic, the Court has also indicated that 
putative speech acts such as fighting words and obscenity fall outside 
the boundaries of the First Amendment in part because they “are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas.”211 
A representational approach to meaning similarly seems to 
animate some of the Court’s efforts to define what kinds of nonverbal 
conduct qualify for First Amendment coverage. By now “[i]t is well 
settled that the First Amendment’s protections extend to nonverbal 
‘expressive conduct’ or ‘symbolic speech.’”212 And meaning seems to 
be the ingredient that makes that extension possible. In West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette,213 for example, the Court 
 
 206. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 207. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see also Police 
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to 
express any thought, free from government censorship.”).  
 208. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)); see N.Y. State Bd. of 
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (“The First Amendment creates an open 
marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without government 
interference.”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The hallmark of the protection of 
free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’ . . . .” (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
 209. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 210. Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).  
 211. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). It also matters that such 
speech acts “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id. at 572.  
 212. Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1108, 1114 n.18 (2005).  
 213. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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indicated that expressive conduct (in that case, saluting a flag) is 
“speech” for constitutional purposes because it conveys “ideas.”214 A 
similar premise seems to animate Spence v. Washington,215 the Court’s 
most direct effort to define the essential elements that transform 
conduct into speech. In that case, the Court set out to evaluate 
whether conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope” of the First Amendment.216 
The test it created asks whether “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed 
it.”217 Conduct that satisfies both prongs of this test is considered to be 
expressive. Spence therefore effectively doubles down on the 
importance of representational meaning, requiring both that the 
speaker intend to convey it (in “particularized” form, no less) and 
also that there be a “great” likelihood that the audience understand 
it. 
Despite its frequent appearances in First Amendment doctrine, 
the representational approach to meaning is a poor guide to what 
speech the First Amendment actually does or should protect. Indeed, 
the representational approach to meaning, combined with the 
meaning-dependent approach to the First Amendment discussed 
above,218 leads to the problems of underinclusion suggested by Part I. 
 
 214. See id. at 632 (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”). 
 215. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1537 (referring 
to Spence as “the only real test that the Court has articulated to identify ‘speech’ in the First 
Amendment sphere”). Tiersma’s use of “only” was probably accurate at the time, but it now 
needs some qualification, given that Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group 
of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and other cases seem to have replaced or at the very least 
altered Spence’s test. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), rather than applying (or even citing) Spence, the Court asked whether 
the activity at issue was “inherently expressive,” such that a viewer could understand its 
meaning without further explanation. See id. at 66. Excluding military recruiters from campus to 
express disagreement with the military’s policies did not meet this test, the Court found, because 
such exclusion might well be the result of room scarcity. Id. 
 216. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“Johnson’s 
burning of the flag was conduct ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication’ to 
implicate the First Amendment.” (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409)). But see Johnson, 491 U.S. 
at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]lag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or 
roar . . . .”). 
 217. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11; see R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First 
Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1238 (2010) 
(“In the absence of the speaker’s intent to promote some more or less determinate 
understanding, we may be skeptical that speech in the constitutional sense is present.”). 
 218. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
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As Greenman points out, ideaism “fails to predict what the First 
Amendment actually covers.”219 In United States v. O’Brien,220 the 
Court clarified that the mere intent to convey meaning is not 
sufficient for First Amendment coverage: “We cannot accept the view 
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea.”221 
Nor is a connection between language and concept necessary for 
the Amendment’s protections to attach. Music, for example, is clearly 
protected by the First Amendment,222 even though a great deal of it 
does not convey meaning in any standard sense. As Richard Posner 
writes, “[E]ven if ‘thought,’ ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ and ‘opinion’ are 
broadly defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if 
music is regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding 
ideas and opinions.”223 In other ways, too, the Constitution protects 
efforts to say the unsayable. Justice Harlan explained in Cohen v. 
California that “much linguistic expression serves a dual 
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of 
relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible 
emotions as well.”224 
Under the representational approach to meaning, expression of 
the “inexpressible” is by definition nonsensical.225 But as Justice 
 
 219. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1348; see also Post, supra note 42, at 1252 (showing that the 
Spence test is overinclusive); Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 773 (showing that the Spence test is 
underinclusive). 
 220. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 221. Id. at 376.  
 222. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form of 
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”); see also Reed v. 
Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If the defendants passed an ordinance 
forbidding the playing of rock and roll music . . . , they would be infringing a First Amendment 
right, even if the music had no political message—even if it had no words . . . .” (citation 
omitted)).  
 223. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
concurring), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); see also David 
Munkittrick, Note, Music as Speech: A First Amendment Category unto Itself, 62 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 665, 668 (2010) (“[N]o single First Amendment theory fully explains protection of music as 
speech.”). But see ROSEN, supra note 62, at 11 (“Felix Mendelssohn found the meaning of music 
more precise, not less, than language, but that is because music means what it is, not what it 
says.”). 
 224. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emphasis added).  
 225. See AYER, supra note 202, at 118 (“If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is 
something which cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense 
when he describes it.”). 
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Harlan suggests, and as Part I argues, it is also properly covered by 
the First Amendment. It follows that the representational approach, 
whatever its intuitive appeal, is a poor guide to the boundaries of the 
First Amendment. If it is to matter, “meaning” must lie elsewhere 
than in the relationship between speech and concepts. 
B. Use Meaning 
The best place to find an alternative to the representational 
approach associated with Russell and Wittgenstein is in the work of 
Wittgenstein himself. His later thought—especially the enormously 
influential concept of language games—reshaped the whole of 
analytic philosophy, putting it on the “linguistic turn” that led to 
speech-act theory, ordinary-language philosophy, and a host of other 
important developments. From these developments emerges a new 
way of thinking about language and meaning that is ultimately a 
better guide for the First Amendment. 
After leaving philosophical work behind for nearly a decade, 
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 and took a new approach 
to the relationship between language, meaning, and the world. This 
work culminated in the posthumous publication of Philosophical 
Investigations. It was here that Wittgenstein “reject[ed] the search for 
a unified account of language’s internal logic, which had occupied the 
bulk of . . . the Tractatus.”226 Indeed, he described the Philosophical 
Investigations as a rejoinder to “what logicians have said about the 
structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus.)”227 
Instead of the picture theory of meaning that animated his 
earlier work, Wittgenstein now focused on “language games” as 
defining the limits of meaning and, therefore, the world: “I shall also 
call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven, the ‘language-game’.”228 The term, he said, was “meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of 
an activity, or of a form of life.”229 The nature of these games became 
 
 226. Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of 
Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11 (2010). 
 227. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 23. 
 228. Id. § 7. 
 229. Id. § 23; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2613 (2007) (“‘Form of life’ is a 
technical term meant to convey the multiplicity of both possible ways of living and possible ways 
BLOCHER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:10 PM 
1468 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1423 
Wittgenstein’s focus for the rest of his life. As Patterson explains, 
“The central tenet of Wittgenstein’s writing after 1929 is that 
knowledge is not achieved by the individual subject’s grasp of a 
connection between word and object. Rather, knowledge turns out to 
be the grasp of the topography of a word’s uses in activities into 
which language is woven.”230 
The language-games approach locates meaning in language’s use, 
not in its representation of the world. As Wittgenstein put it in the 
Philosophical Investigations, “For a large class of cases—though not 
for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined 
thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”231 The way to 
identify meaning, therefore, is not necessarily to ask whether a 
putative speaker has given content to signs in his propositions, but 
rather whether he has followed the rules of the relevant language 
game. Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson explain: “As a tradition now 
identified with Wittgenstein and his successors insists, there are only 
‘practices,’ each constituted by inchoate and unformalizable standards 
that establish one’s statements . . . as ‘legitimately assertable’ by 
persons within the interpretive community that constitutes the 
practice in question.”232 
The tradition to which Balkin and Levinson refer has now spread 
throughout analytic philosophy.233 The later Wittgenstein is therefore 
important not only on his own terms, but also because he shaped so 
many other philosophical developments throughout the past 
century.234 The branches on that tree are too numerous to count and 
 
of seeing and responding to the world. The ability to speak a language is the ability to engage in 
practices within a form of life in which that language has meaning.”). 
 230. Patterson, supra note 37, at 303–04; see also Fiss, supra note 37, at 177 (describing 
Wittgenstein’s view that “we understand a concept not when we grasp some fact, but when we 
can successfully use that concept within a language game or a defined context”). 
 231. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 43; see also Jonathan Yovel, What Is Contract Law 
“About”? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of “Skeletal Promises,” 94 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 939 
(2000) (noting that Wittgenstein and the theories of performative language that owe him a debt 
“all share a basic insight: that language is not primarily about meaning in the traditional, 
semantical sense associated with representationalism” but rather that “language is primarily 
about action—speech and texts are acts, and they perform things in the social world and bring 
about different kinds of effects”). 
 232. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1597, 1604 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
 233. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein’s influence is universal, nor that 
the developments discussed here are the only important ones in analytic philosophy. 
 234. See Chevigny, supra note 95, at 163–72. 
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too complex to describe, but include the work of Paul Grice,235 the 
speech-act theory associated most closely with J.L. Austin and John 
R. Searle,236 and ordinary-language philosophy.237 
Most importantly for present purposes, the use-meaning 
approach has gained traction in First Amendment doctrine and 
scholarship. Post, for example, argues that Marcel Duchamp’s The 
Fountain—a urinal turned on its side—is properly recognized as 
artistic speech precisely because of the shared norms of the artistic 
community.238 This is because it is a “form[] of communication that 
sociologically we recognize as art.”239 Taking a similar approach, Amy 
Adler points to the example of Annie Sprinkle, a performance artist 
who also works in the pornography industry: “When asked if anything 
made Sprinkle’s performance at the Kitchen [Center for the 
Performing Arts] ‘art’ and her performance for Screw [magazine] 
 
 235. Grice’s basic argument—vastly oversimplified—was that for A to mean something by 
X, X must be uttered with an intention of producing some belief or effect in the listener, B, by 
means of B’s recognition of A’s intent. See generally H.P. Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377 
(1957). Later, Grice would further develop the idea of speaker meaning via analyzing sentences 
as units of meaning and differentiating between indicative and imperative meaning. See 
generally H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 FOUND. 
LANGUAGE 225 (1968). 
 236. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS (1979); JOHN 
R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND (1983); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).  
  As suggested by the title of Austin’s seminal How To Do Things with Words, the 
central insight of speech-act theory is that speech can do things, as for example when a person 
says, “I am sorry.” Uttering those words does not merely report meaning by describing a 
situation or a state of mind, but actually performs the act of apologizing. The same can be said 
of promises, AUSTIN, supra, at 10; the words “I do” in the context of a wedding ceremony, id. at 
6; or—as Akhil Amar has suggested, channeling Austin—the phrase “We the People . . . do 
ordain and establish” in the Preamble of the United States Constitution, AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005).  
 237. Toril Moi, “They Practice Their Trades in Different Worlds”: Concepts in 
Poststructuralism and Ordinary Language Philosophy, 40 NEW LITERARY HIST. 801, 802 (2009) 
(defining ordinary-language philosophy as “the philosophical tradition after Wittgenstein and J. 
L. Austin as established . . . in [Stanley] Cavell’s work”). See generally STANLEY CAVELL, MUST 
WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? (updated ed. 2002). 
 238. Post, supra note 42, at 1253–54; cf. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic 
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2004) (“A democratic culture is democratic in the sense that everyone—not just political, 
economic, or cultural elites—has a fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in 
the development of the ideas and meanings that constitute them and the communities and 
subcommunities to which they belong. . . . Freedom of expression protects the ability of 
individuals to participate in the culture in which they live . . . .”). 
 239. Post, Reply, supra note 21, at 621. 
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‘pornography,’ a spokesman for the Kitchen said, ‘Here it was 
performed in an art context.’”240 These are arguments rooted in use, 
not in representation. 
Such examples raise the question of whether the use approach 
provides any boundaries whatsoever between meaning and nonsense. 
Indeed, if not applied rigorously, the fuzziness inherent in evaluating 
language games and social practices can be made to shield nearly any 
act or utterance.241 But although use meaning is potentially more 
capacious with regard to meaning than the representational approach, 
it is not all-encompassing. By establishing a new approach to 
meaning, the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy simply creates a 
new and potentially richer approach to nonsense and language.242 
Rather than arising from a disjunction between language and 
extralinguistic facts, speech is nonsensical when it fails to adhere to 
the rules of the relevant language game. Professor Jonathan Yovel 
explains that “one plays a language-game by the act of following its 
rules; deviation from the rules is ‘not playing the game,’ which 
produces nonsense in relation to the language-game in question.”243 
Identifying and evaluating meaning, then, requires focus on how 
language is actually used. 
In a variety of ways, the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed 
this view, suggesting that the First Amendment has at least partially 
taken its own linguistic turn with regard to meaning. This is a 
welcome development both descriptively and normatively, for the 
use-meaning approach better captures both the actual contours of 
existing First Amendment coverage and the constitutional value of 
what would otherwise seem to be meaningless speech. 
 
 240. Adler, supra note 10, at 1370. 
 241. Cf. Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 629, 648 
(2000) (“[T]he Court seems to believe that every human act has ‘meaning,’ and thus may convey 
a ‘message.’”). Tien goes on to discuss City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), in which the 
Court concluded that social dancing is not speech, even though “some kernel of expression” can 
be found in almost all human activity. Tien, supra, at 648–49 (quoting Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25). 
 242. See Tilghman, supra note 24, at 256 (“Wittgenstein went on to provide a still richer 
exploration of nonsense in the Philosophical Investigations where he locates a craving for 
nonsense in certain deep aspects of our language and our life. It is this craving that he believes is 
responsible for much of traditional philosophy which, on his view, turns out to be grounded in 
conceptual confusion and therefore a kind of nonsense.”). 
 243. Yovel, supra note 231, at 941; see also Bartrum, supra note 226, at 11 (“[A] word’s 
meaning often does not derive from some foundational referent in the world, but, rather, is 
determined by the use to which it is properly put within a particular language-game.”).  
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The First Amendment’s linguistic turn manifests itself in many 
areas of doctrine, perhaps most prominently in cases that tinker with 
Spence’s representationalist machinery. In Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,244 for example, the 
Court assessed the constitutional salience of a Hibernian pride 
parade. The Justices conceded that it was difficult to locate a “narrow, 
succinctly articulable message” in the parade,245 but concluded that no 
such showing was required. A unanimous Court held that the parade 
qualified for protection, and that “if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ [the First Amendment] would 
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, 
music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll.”246 This is effectively a rejection of the representational 
approach and an endorsement of the idea that meaning lies in form 
and use. 
The distinction between the representational and use approaches 
animates many other cases as well. Recall Morse v. Frederick. On a 
strictly representational approach, the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS”247 seems just as nonsensical as Chomsky’s “[c]olorless green 
ideas sleep furiously”248—each idea might represent a concept, but 
strung together they convey nothing sensible.249 (Conversely, if a 
group of students displayed the latter on a banner, it might also 
reasonably be viewed as promoting—or perhaps demonstrating—
illegal drug use!) Indeed, the student’s declaration that the banner 
was designed to be nonsense, if accepted, should have taken him 
outside the realm of Spence v. Washington, because no “intent to 
convey a particularized message was present.”250 To the 
representationalist, then, the act involved only nonsense. If the First 
 
 244. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
 245. Id. at 569. 
 246. Id. at 568–69 (citation omitted). 
 247. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 248. CHOMSKY, supra note 70, at 15.  
 249. See Bill Poser, The Supreme Court Fails Semantics, LANGUAGE LOG (July 7, 2007, 5:09 
AM), http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004696.html (“[T]he Court has 
invalidly inferred a particular proposition. The slogan is in fact meaningless in the sense that it 
expresses no proposition, and Frederick gave a perfectly plausible explanation for the use of a 
meaningless slogan. The Court was therefore wrong in finding that the banner advocates the use 
of marijuana.”). 
 250. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
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Amendment requires the presence of meaning,251 then there was no 
constitutional issue to begin with. 
Under a use-meaning approach, by contrast, the fact that the 
banner’s words conveyed no semantic content does not preclude 
them from having meaning, which derives from use, not 
representation. That use, the majority concluded, imbued them with 
drug-promoting meaning, not simply television-attracting meaning. In 
other words, the use-meaning approach can account for the existence 
of meaning in the banner, therefore bringing the case within the 
boundaries of the First Amendment and enabling the more 
substantive and useful debate over whether the majority identified 
the correct meaning, and whether the government had sufficient 
reason to regulate it.252 
This is the same basic insight reflected in the First Amendment’s 
attention to context as a component of meaning. The representational 
approach is relatively, if not entirely, acontextual. Whether a word 
“really” corresponds to an underlying concept is generally not 
dependent on the context in which that word is deployed. But First 
Amendment doctrine itself is deeply attuned to the fact that context 
can create or change meaning.253 Even Spence recognized that 
“context may give meaning to [a] symbol.”254 The Court there noted 
that hanging a flag upside down with peace symbols attached to it 
 
 251. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
 252. The meaning (or lack thereof) of the banner would of course be relevant to that 
inquiry. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that nonsense should be free from government 
regulation precisely because it lacks meaning. See Chevigny, supra note 95, at 164 (arguing that 
under the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as nonsense, the “most appropriate argument for 
freedom of speech would be that people ought to be allowed to say what they please, at least 
about questions of norms and values, because what they say is meaningless,” and that “[t]he 
government could have no reason to restrain debate that might continue endlessly without hope 
of a fruitful result”); see also Catherine L. Amspacher & Randel Steven Springer, Note, Humor, 
Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Potential Predicament for 
Private Figure Plaintiffs, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 726 (1990) (“[E]xpressions . . . that 
courts classify as ‘nonsense’ or ‘fantasy’ are protected from defamation suits because, by 
definition, no one will believe them to be literally true.”); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 182 
(describing the “rationality” challenge to regulations of art as “assert[ing] that the grounds for 
such regulations are typically so weak that the artworks would be protected by a substantive due 
process requirement that exercises of government power must be minimally rational”). 
 253. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous 
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 
676 (1990) (“[T]he judgment that speech is being communicated in a ‘public’ manner ultimately 
depends upon the particular context of a specific communicative act . . . .”). 
 254. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
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related to a “contemporaneous issue of intense public concern,”255 and 
that observers were likely to recognize Spence’s point “at the time 
that he made it,”256 even though in a different context it “might be 
interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior.”257 A similar 
principle seems to be on display (so to speak) in the Court’s nude 
dancing cases, in which the Justices have taken pains to distinguish 
between “bacchanalian revelries” in barrooms and “a performance by 
a scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater.”258 
Further hints of the use-meaning approach can be found in the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that First Amendment coverage extends 
to practices that form a “significant medium for the communication of 
ideas,”259 even if the specific communication at issue does not 
successfully convey a particularized message.260 Post has provided the 
strongest normative justification for this approach, arguing that “First 
Amendment coverage presumptively extends to media for the 
communication of ideas, like newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or 
cinema, which are the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts 
that define and sustain the public sphere.”261 It follows that, “[i]n the 
absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such 
media is covered by the First Amendment.”262 On this approach, 
“Jabberwocky” is covered by the First Amendment not because its 
words represent concepts, but because it is recognizable as a poem. 
The same basic intuition might be animating the appealing but 
problematic effort to draw a line between “pure speech” and 
expressive conduct. The Supreme Court has suggested that pure 
speech—apparently conceived as the spoken or written word, with no 
 
 255. Id. That context included “the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State 
University, events which occurred a few days prior to [Spence’s] arrest.” Id. at 408. 
 256. Id. at 410. 
 257. Id.  
 258. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972); see Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech 
and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1873 (1997) (“The Supreme Court’s nude-
dancing cases establish the proposition that constitutional significance may be ascribed to the 
context in which the dancing takes place.”). 
 259. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
 260. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (holding that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection”). 
 261. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 20. 
 262. Id. 
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accompanying nonverbal action263—should receive complete 
constitutional coverage,264 apparently without any further inquiry into 
its meaningfulness. Expressive conduct, by contrast, is covered only 
when it is sufficiently imbued with “communicative element[s]” as to 
bring it within the boundaries of the Amendment.265 In other words, it 
must, at least according to some accounts, convey ideas or meaning.266 
The pure speech/expressive conduct dichotomy is deeply difficult,267 
largely inaccurate,268 and probably unworkable. But the effort itself 
demonstrates that meaning may lie in form and use, rather than in 
representation.269 
C. Making the Most of the First Amendment’s Linguistic Turn 
Endorsing use meaning as an alternative to representational 
meaning is relatively easy; implementing it is not. It should by now be 
apparent that the boundaries of the First Amendment cannot be 
explained on the basis of the relationship between language and 
extralinguistic facts, as the representational-meaning approach would 
suggest. But to say that those boundaries do or should depend instead 
 
 263. See Susan Jill Rice, Note, The Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of 
the Judicial Response to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 561, 563 (1988) (“Pure speech may be defined as expression in its pristine state, 
completely isolated from activity.”); Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The United 
States Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place 
and Manner Restrictions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 471 (1992) (“Pure speech has been generally 
defined as communicative expression in a pure state without physical activity.”). 
 264. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) 
(noting that wearing armbands is “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, 
is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment”). 
 265. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 266. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 3, at 37 (“[S]ymbolic speech requires not merely that 
given conduct results in a meaning effect, but that the actor causing such conduct must intend 
such a meaning effect by his conduct.”). 
 267. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493–96 (1975) (arguing that 
the burning of a draft card is “100% action and 100% expression”); see also Tushnet, supra note 
9, at 192–99 (describing the “[a]ttractions and [p]erils of [n]ominalism,” the idea that “[t]he First 
Amendment is about speech and the press—about words”). 
 268. Certain kinds of speech, including obscenity, are thought to fall outside the scope of the 
First Amendment, even when they are pure speech. See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying 
text. 
 269. See Post, supra note 42, at 1257 (“The very concept of a medium presupposes that 
constitutionally protected expression does not inhere in abstract and disembodied acts of 
communication of the kind envisioned by Spence, but is instead always conveyed through social 
and material forms of interaction.”). 
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on language games raises a new, albeit more useful, set of questions. 
This final section explores a few of them. 
First, by focusing on language games rather than on the 
connection between words and ideas, the approach here would 
exclude from First Amendment coverage acts that, despite being 
“communicative” in some sense, are not traditionally recognized as 
“speech.” This could explain why many prominent First Amendment 
scholars have rejected a generalist account of the constitutional value 
of form,270 focusing instead on the transmission of ideas.271 
This objection is difficult and deceptively complex, as is the best 
answer to it: that such activities, whatever relationships they might 
have with the First Amendment’s values, simply are not speech. 
Consider Jed Rubenfeld’s example of a person who speeds to express 
disapproval of speed limits,272 or Tushnet’s example of ticket 
scalping.273 These activities arguably further First Amendment values 
by advancing the autonomy interests of those engaged in them, and 
perhaps even communicate ideas. But so do innumerable other 
activities, from terrorist attacks to rape. Prohibition of those activities 
is perfectly constitutional under the First Amendment not because 
the government interest in doing so is sufficiently strong, but because 
they are not thought to implicate the First Amendment at all. To 
borrow Schauer’s terminology, they are uncovered, not merely 
unprotected.274 
 
 270. See Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term—Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (1968) (“The meaningful constitutional distinction is not between 
speech and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of 
conduct. If it is intended as expression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a 
common comprehensible form of expression, it is ‘speech.’”); Melville B. Nimmer, Does 
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. 
REV. 1180, 1189 (1970) (exploring the argument that the First Amendment protects ideas rather 
than particular forms of expression). 
 271. See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 34 (“It is the ideas expressed, and not just a particular 
form of expression, that must be protected if the underlying first amendment values are to be 
realized.”). 
 272. See Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 772 (“But suppose A says that his conduct was 
expressive. Suppose he says that driving fast is how he ‘expresses himself.’ Or that he was 
‘expressing disagreement’ with the federally mandated speed limit. Or that his speeding was 
‘performance art.’”). 
 273. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 194 (explaining why “ticket scalping is outside the First 
Amendment’s coverage”). But see id. (criticizing the argument that “a reasonably widespread 
imputation of roughly the same meaning” can implicate First Amendment coverage). 
 274. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 267 (defining the question of “coverage” as “[w]hat marks 
off the category covered by the first amendment from those other categories of conduct that do 
not implicate free speech analysis”). 
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The question of what constitutes “speech” is, in turn, an old one 
for First Amendment theory and doctrine, and the difficulty of 
articulating anything like a precise definition is familiar. This Article 
has focused on one possible component of speech—meaning—not the 
concept of speech as a whole. The two inquiries might be distinct; 
perhaps meaning must be accompanied by a volitional act or 
utterance to constitute speech. To the degree that the discussion here 
provides lessons for the quest to define speech itself, it is that the 
answers probably lie in social practices rather than in formal logic.275 
In the end, as Schauer explains, “the very idea of free speech is a 
crude implement, to the core, protecting acts that its background 
justifications would not protect, and failing to protect acts that its 
background justifications would protect.”276 
But the crudeness of the implement raises another and perhaps 
equally foundational challenge for the use-meaning approach: 
negotiating the tension between the First Amendment’s desire for 
clear boundaries and language games’ resistance to them. As to the 
former, the importance of clarity in First Amendment doctrine is 
recognized as valuable in its own right.277 Language games, however, 
are a poor guide for establishing clear boundaries. Both in their 
definition and in their behavior, language games “lack purity.”278 Post, 
whose First Amendment theory depends on identifying those 
boundaries, concludes that although we do not “have a very clear or 
hard-edged account” of the boundaries of public discourse, “it is 
anthropologically apparent that they do exist and are reflected in 
constitutional doctrine.”279 Ordinary-language philosophers, too, 
embrace this as not merely a necessary drawback, but a positive 
feature of their approach. As Toril Moi explains, “Often the blurred 
 
 275. This is the quest in which Post has long been engaged. See, e.g., Post, supra note 42, at 
1250. 
 276. Schauer, supra note 98, at 13. 
 277. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (holding a statute void for 
vagueness under a First Amendment analysis because of its chilling effect on protected speech); 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (upholding a federal injunction against state 
court prosecutions under vague state statutes, on the basis of the prosecutions’ “chilling” effect). 
 278. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 45, at 1802; see also Chevigny, supra note 95, at 167 
(“Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game’ concept has been criticized for a lack of precision.”); Biletzki 
& Matar, supra note 68 (noting that Wittgenstein “never explicitly defines” the concept of 
language game). 
 279. Post, Reply, supra note 21, at 622–23. 
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concept is exactly what we want . . . . In many cases . . . , it is useless to 
spend time and energy trying to produce a sharp concept.”280 
The problem is not simply that language games have fuzzy 
boundaries, but that it is difficult to know at what level of generality 
they should be defined. After all, “use” can refer to an individual 
speech act or to a broader category of speech acts bearing a family 
resemblance;281 language games can involve two people, a group, or an 
entire community. Ordinary-language philosophy typically takes the 
former route, focusing on the meaning of particular speech acts. The 
inevitable result is a kind of case-by-case analysis that requires careful 
consideration of individual speech acts. 
But whatever its merits as a philosophical approach to language, 
the case-by-case approach does not necessarily make for good free 
speech law. Case-by-case ex post analysis is ill-suited to provide the 
kind of articulable ex ante rules that law—and especially First 
Amendment doctrine—is generally thought to require.282 First 
Amendment language games must be defined with sufficient breadth 
that individuals can tailor their conduct accordingly. A use-meaning 
approach to the Amendment’s boundaries must therefore focus to 
some degree on form and use, rather than act and use. 
The cost of that breadth, however, is inaccuracy. The more 
broadly a First Amendment language game is defined, the less likely 
it is to capture the values that justify its protection, and the more 
likely it is to be overinclusive with regard to speech. But that is a cost 
that the First Amendment encourages us to pay.283 Defining speech at 
 
 280. Moi, supra note 237, at 814. 
 281. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 3.311, at 51 (“An expression presupposes the 
forms of all propositions in which it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of 
propositions.”).  
 282. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
has held that in such circumstances ‘more precision in drafting may be required because of the 
vagueness doctrine in the case of regulation of expression,’ a ‘greater degree of specificity’ is 
demanded than in other contexts.” (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 
(1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974))); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108–09 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . . . [W]here a vague statute ‘abut[s] 
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of 
[those] freedoms.’” (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961))). 
 283. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 22 (“[T]he idea of free speech, as contrasted with the 
justifications it is thought to serve, is itself an exercise in distrust, in suboptimality, and in the 
recognition of the frequent virtues of second-best solutions.”). 
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the level of form rather than that of individual speech acts may be 
imperfect, but it does help check the government’s power to regulate 
speech by defining its boundaries. 
The malleability of the language game approach also suggests 
ways to account for new social practices and language games—video 
games, for example.284 Defining these as “speech” based on the ideas 
they convey seems unsatisfying, to say the least. The answer seems to 
lie instead with the fact that over time they have simply become 
recognized as such. Admittedly, the power to make that 
determination is itself a form of speech regulation.285 But such line 
drawing is inevitably a part of First Amendment doctrine. Better that 
the lines be drawn on the basis of such social practices than on the 
basis of supposed relationships between words and concepts. 
There are no straightforward and simple solutions to these 
problems.286 First Amendment doctrine has proven slithy287 enough to 
cover the Jabberwocky and other nonsensical speech, but perhaps the 
Justices will see fit to gimble288 exceptions for other kinds of nonsense, 
leaving even nonartists mimsy.289 First Amendment doctrine and the 
language games on which it is based are messy and ongoing 
projects—an experiment, “as all life is an experiment.”290 The 
Amendment’s “linguistic turn” would yield no more clear answers 
than the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. But it would, at the 
very least, better capture what we mean by meaning, and why we 
think it matters for the First Amendment. 
 
 284. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (striking down, on 
First Amendment grounds, restrictions on sales of violent video games to minors); see also 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460. 482 (2010) (striking down restrictions on depictions of 
animal cruelty). 
 285. See Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s 
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1303, 1343 (2009) (“Whether through its political or its judicial branches, 
governmental definition of the scope of public discourse is itself a regulation of public 
discourse . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 286. See Post, supra note 253, at 683 (“In the end . . . there can be no final account of the 
boundaries of the domain of public discourse.”). 
 287. See LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 149 (Martin 
Gardner ed., 2000) (defining “slythy” as a “compound[] of SLIMY and LITHE,” meaning 
“[s]mooth and active”). 
 288. CARROLL, supra note 54, at 21; see CARROLL, supra note 287, at 149 (defining 
“gymble” as “[t]o screw out holes”). 
 289. CARROLL, supra note 287, at 149 (defining “mimsy” as “MISERABLE” or “[u]nhappy”). 
 290. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
What is the doctrinal or “practical” significance of this inquiry? 
At a basic level, the argument is simply that the First Amendment 
should be—and to a large extent already is—interested in use 
meaning, rather than representational meaning. It follows that some 
“nonsense” is entitled to constitutional protection. This conclusion is 
neither dependent on any conclusion about analytic philosophy, nor 
does it require judges, lawyers, or scholars to be philosophers. And 
yet the philosophical inquiries of the past century are so similar in 
substance to those needed in the First Amendment context that the 
former provide useful guidance for the latter. 
This Article also indicates a different approach to establishing 
whether nonrepresentational art—including instrumental music and 
nonsensical poetry—should be entitled to constitutional protection. 
The frequency with which scholars focus specifically on 
nonrepresentational art suggests that they believe 
representationalism to be an essential part of defining the First 
Amendment’s scope. The argument here suggests that it is not, and 
that a more useful inquiry would focus on social understandings of art 
in various contexts. 
Relatedly, the search for meaning in social usages rather than in 
representationalism could extend not just to whether a speech act is 
meaningful, but also which of many possible meanings it should have. 
This raises difficult questions when considered in light of the putative 
speaker’s mental state. On the one hand, that seems perfectly 
straightforward: surely “Fuck the Draft” had a particular meaning 
precisely because of the broader social context in which it was used.291 
But if speech is fully defined by what a viewer (subjective or 
objective) would understand, then even “innocent” speakers—
including those who intend no offense—might be found liable for 
meanings they never meant to convey. 
Finally, focusing on the social embeddedness of speech has 
implications for the degree to which speakers can actually control the 
meaning of their own speech—whether it has any at all, and, if so, 
what meaning it has. The use-meaning approach described here 
 
 291. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 409–10 (1974) (concluding that when the flag was hung from a window with a peace sign 
taped to it, “the nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual context and environment in 
which it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that [Spence] engaged in a form of protected 
expression”). 
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would effectively deny constitutional coverage to putative speech acts 
which, though perhaps meaningful to the speaker, do not respect the 
rules of our shared language games.292 Our old friend Lewis Carroll 
provides the perfect illustration: 
 
  “And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for 
you!” 
  “I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said. 
  Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—
till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for 
you!’” 
  “But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice 
objected. 
  “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful 
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor 
less.” 
  “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words 
mean so many different things.” 
  “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be 
master—that’s all.”293 
 
Humpty Dumpty is violating the rules of a language game, and thus 
speaking nonsense, but the question he identifies is essentially the 
same one asked by analytic philosophers. The use-meaning approach 
denies that the speaker is inevitably master of meaning, which has a 
variety of potentially troubling implications—consider again the 
student in Morse, who claimed to be speaking nonsense—that deserve 
further exploration. 
Given that Ludwig Wittgenstein has served as a guide and 
occasional stalking horse throughout this Article, it seems 
appropriate to conclude where the Tractatus does. The seventh and 
final section famously reads, in full: “Whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent.”294 If the boundaries of the First 
Amendment depend on the presence of representational meaning, 
 
 292. Cf. 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 
234 (1985) (“Men speak together, to each other. Language is fashioned and grows not 
principally in monologue, but in dialogue, or better, in the life of the speech community.”); 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 243 (arguing that a private language—one whose “individual 
words . . . are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate 
private sensations”—cannot have meaning).  
 293. CARROLL, supra note 54, at 123–24. 
 294. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 7, at 189. 
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then Congress could codify Wittgenstein’s admonition without 
violating the Constitution, because saying what cannot be said is, by 
definition, nonsense. This Article has argued that this cannot be the 
case, and that the meaning of speech lies not in its connection to 
extralinguistic facts, but in its use. This road is bumpier, but its 
imperfection offers better footing than the smooth alternatives. “Back 
to the rough ground!”295 
 
 
 295. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 107 (“We have got on to slippery ice where there 
is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we 
are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!”). 
 
